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ABSTRACT 
All That is Possible Can Be Imagined: Leibniz's Von der Allmacht 
by 
Maria S. Picone 
Leibniz's 'Von der Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes und der Freiheit des 
Menschen' is obscure and misunderstood. First I do a close reading of the work. Then I 
will discuss some scholarly interpretations, as well as VdA's place in Leibniz's thought. 
I challenge two scholarly assumptions-the first being that Leibniz rejected then 
accepted privation theory. I argue that there are two types of privation theories, using 
illustrative historical examples, and that Leibniz objected to one and adopted the other. 
Secondly, many scholars opine that the Confessio is a juvenile Theodicy. I take VdA to 
be an important predecessor to the Theodicy due to similarities in style, content and 
method. Finally, I link Leibniz's definition of possibility in VdA with an important 
connection between truth and existence. In this respect, Leibniz's ideas of possibility and 
conceivability are the forerunners of a current topic in philosophy. 
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Introduction 
'Von der Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes und der Freiheit des Menschen', or 'On the 
Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and the Freedom ofMan' (henceforth VdA) is a 
unique work on the problem of evil that has often been misunderstood. To be certain, it is 
a bewildering work--one of the few Leibniz wrote in German, it seems to offer no 
positive conclusions and is often placed in the development ofLeibniz's thought on evil 
as an unfinished footnote to the Confessio Philosophi. In this paper, I intend to wrestle 
with the standard view of V dA as an aporetic predecessor to the Confessio, bringing the 
text to a wider audience. I begin with an analysis ofVdA that sets aside Leibniz's other 
works on evil, free will and necessity, as well as any scholarly interpretations. In VdA 
Leibniz does refute both what he will later call the 'lazy reason' and a version of 
medieval privation theory, but he does so via his positive views on possibility and 
necessity. These views are the main positive contributions of the work. VdA has been 
overlooked largely because readers expecting a lengthy discussion on the problem of evil 
come away disappointed; however, the positive theses within do have a large impact on 
Leibniz's views of evil, free will and grace. Finally, Leibniz does make statements about 
punishments and rewards, concepts which are intertwined with grace and the justice of 
God, understood in Leibniz as the template of divine harmony. 
Originally I presented my analysis as a close reading that followed the order of the text. 
However, in this paper I will present VdA's main ideas before noting some other 
important aspects. Both the main ideas and the other aspects will be the subject of further 
discussion later on; however, I intend to present them all as a package to underscore the 
fruitfulness of V dA and to establish a common understanding of V dA before examining 
its place in Leibniz's philosophy. The next step is to bring VdA into the context of 
Leibniz's other early writings, especially the Col?fossio philosophi. It is not exaggerating 
to say that the only scholarly attention that V dA has received has been motivated by a 
desire to analyze the Col?fossio and surrounding writings. However, despite the paucity of 
scholarly analyses and the brevity of their duration, there are some conflicting opinions 
on the text. Bob Sleigh has discussed it in several published works as well as the 
introduction to the Yale Col?fossio volume; Jack Davidson has a short but excellent 
article in which he focuses on V dA and the Confessio as two early influences on 
Leibniz's Theodicy. Lastly, Paul Rateau, in his book La question du mal chez Leibniz: 
fondements et elaboration de Ia Theodicee, sharply distinguishes V dA from the 
Confessio and puts more emphasis on VdA's impact on the Theodicy than the 
Confessio 's. Rateau's position is the most extreme, and, as such, the most interesting. 
Though I agree that the Col?fossio and V dA have some important differences, the 
evidence that Rateau relies on to strongly differentiate them is weak, since he relies on a 
lost Latin dialogue written before the Confessio and on an arguably coincidental 
connection between V dA and the thought of Luther and Hobbes. Thus I will flesh out the 
differences between V dA and the Confessio on the grounds of their content alone. 
There are some other important threads to explicate, one of which is privation theory, a 
topic specifically addressed in VdA. Roughly, Leibniz rejects the view that God is 
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responsible for all the good in the world, and creatures for all the evil, which is found in 
some Scholastic writers. Having noted the similarities between V dA and another early 
text, 'L'auteur du peche', I believe that Leibniz never changed his stance on historical 
privation theory or on the picture of divine and human concurrence that such a view 
entails. Though Sleigh believes that Leibniz adopted privation theory in the Theodicy 
after realizing that his position in the Confessio was untenable, I agree with Rateau here 
that the switch from the Confessio-period to the Theodicy on privation theory is not a yes-
no heel-tum. I allege that privation theories cannot be neutral with respect to concurrence 
theories. Thus Leibniz does endorse a type of privation theory in the Theodicy; however, 
I also argue that there is more than one type of privation theory. The easiest way to 
advance this thesis is by examining the historical tradition of privation theory, including 
the historical version Leibniz lampoons in V dA and 'L' auteur du peche'. I intend to make 
a distinction between separation and limitation theory, two versions of what is commonly 
called privation theory. I will briefly discuss the hybrid Augustinian-Thomist view which 
is Leibniz's main target in VdA and the Theodicy, and characterize another version of 
limitation theory, that ofPlotinus. My aim here is not to suggest that Leibniz was 
historically aware of these theories or their nuances, but to demonstrate the distinction via 
plausible examples. Then I will make sense of a remark ofLeibniz's, "And it surprises 
me that the profound Descartes stumbled here too".1 'Here' in this case means on the 
issue of divine and human concurrence. Thus I end the section with some preliminary 
work on Leibniz versus Descartes on evil, the locus of which is Leibniz's annotations of 
1 A.VI.i 545. The English quotes ofVdA are from the Yale volume, translated by Brandon Look. Sleigh 
is responsible for the other translations in this volume. 
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Descartes' Principles.2 It is my hope that some work in this area will open up further 
insight and discussion. 
Next, I will discuss Vd.A's relationship to Leibniz's late work on evil, the Theodicy. Until 
recently, scholars have not seen much difference between the Confossio and the Theodicy 
and have understood the Confessio as a juvenile work-in Grua's words, a "Theodicee de 
jeunesse".3 Even Sleigh, who has treated the Corifessio as a work in its own right, 
maintains that Leibniz held a group of "fundamental propositions" at the beginning of his 
career that stayed with him throughout his life, differing only in application. 4 In another 
paper, 'Leibniz's First Theodicy', Sleigh characterizes the Confossio as Leibniz's first 
substantial attempt at solving the package of problems centered around sin. While I 
remain undecided on an issue that Rateau champions-that the Theodicy, which is a word 
coined by Leibniz for his 1710 book, has a unique application to that book and cannot be 
extended to any work taking up the problem of evil and related issues-I do agree with 
him on another point, namely that V dA has more similarities to the Theodicy than the 
Confessio does. 5 
However, more is at stake here than a terminological dispute. In this section I hope to 
demonstrate that V dA has at least as much influence on the Theodicy as the Corifessio 
does. Part of my justification is that there are similarities with respect to the content and 
2 Michael Latzer' s analysis of Descartes' views is the relevant piece of secondary literature to look to 
here; his portrayal of Descartes' theory suggests it anticipates Leibniz's criticism of separation theory 
and his move towards limitation theory. 
3 Grua. vii 
4 Sleigh 166 
5 Paul Rateau, interview held during the Notre Dame Conference "Leibniz's Theodicy: Context and 
Content", South Bend, IN, September 17th, 201 0 
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the topic up for discussion in the Confessio and the Theodicy. By contrast, there are 
similarities of content, style and method between V dA and the Theodicy. It is the method 
ofVdA that renders it a youthful sally into the theodicean style. In all ofLeibniz's other 
writings on evil, he takes a theological and theoretical (metaphysical) standpoint. With 
that being understood, the Theodicy comes as a shock. It's no wonder that for years it was 
treated merely as a quotation source for scholars seeking to advance their own arguments 
about Leibniz's other works, rather than a rich and rewarding philosophical work in its 
own right. My suggestion is that V dA anticipates the aspects of the Theodicy that make 
the book such a difficult read, because Leibniz is discussing the problem of evil from an 
anthropological or practical side as well as a theological and metaphysical one. (Other 
theories of evil have tried to do the same, with predictable results: no one understands). 
Thus, Leibniz appeals to a posteriori evidence and arguments, and emphasizes the role 
human cognition can play in the perception of evil, because he is taking a simultaneous 
bottom-up and top-down approach. Not, as some scholars think, merely because he is 
attempting to cater to a wide audience or trying to please the least common denominator. 
Thus, in order to understand the pragmatic aspect of the Theodicy, one must look to the 
parts that expound human faith and human action. As Leibniz says in VdA, it doesn't 
matter if you understand the metaphysics; "it is enough that you did not want to give up 
your sinning and take responsibility for your salvation".6 Thus, when viewing the 
problem of evil from the viewpoint of a human being who seems doomed to sin, faith 
suffices even if reason fails. Despite there not being an explicit discussion of the faith 
versus reason distinction in V dA, it thus seems to me to be broadcasting the same 
6 A.VI.i 542 
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message as the Theodicy. This aspect of a theory of evil is often overlooked, but is 
extremely important: what is the use of giving a rationale for evil on the one hand and 
understanding it on the other, if there is not a compassionate understanding for evil's 
impact and at least a suggestion about its avoidance presented as well? Leibniz gives 
what I take to be the first humanistic theory of evil since Plotinus, showing both that he 
understands that metaphysics can't console a grieving widow and that being stoically 
optimistic and faithful really is the only defense on 'the front lines' of evil. 
The last thread that I will take up is Leibniz's linkage of possibility with imagination. 
First of all, in V dA Leibniz introduces a notion of possibility wherein possibility is linked 
to being able to imagine something; therefore, being impossible involves just the 
opposite, not being able to imagine something happening. Moreover, the metaphysical 
notion of possibility that Leibniz is getting at here is a formal, logical notion. 
Furthermore, insofar as the rationalists are linked to such a concept, it is used to connect 
epistemological truth to metaphysical existence. In fact, in a recent paper, David 
Chalmers argues that "there is a long tradition in philosophy of using a priori methods to 
draw conclusions about what is possible and what is necessary, and often in turn to draw 
conclusions about matters of substantive metaphysics". 7 He traces the basic structure of 
this argument as beginning with ''what can be known or conceived", going through the 
possible or necessary, and then arriving at a claim about things in the world.8 Chalmers 
defines several types of possible relationships between possibility and conceivability, and 
I will demonstrate which one matches Leibniz's. Both Leibniz and Chalmers agree that it 
7 Chalmers 145 
8 Ibid. 
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is too easy merely to equate epistemology with modality, however, which leads to a rich 
but difficult notion of possible conceivables for Leibniz. In this section I will argue that 
Leibniz's thoughts on this issue, both in VdA and in the Theodicy, deserve a closer look 
and add something of value to the contemporary debate, which began with a paper of 
Y ablo' s and has attracted a lot of recent attention. 
Possibility and the Lazy Reason in V dA 
A sensible first impression of V dA is, "What just happened?" The more you look at 
"Damit wir aber", the more it looks like a swear, as though it leads into a section that 
would banish some of our perplexity but instead leaves us as frustrated and regretful as 
Sappho's famous "alla pan tomaton". The 'But we' that begins section twenty seems to 
signal a sea change, a rhetorical transition from "Look what the ignorant think" to ''this is 
what 'we' the enlightened think". Of course we will never know what Leibniz intended to 
write. Thus, it is doubly important that we understand what he has already written. Before 
entangling with the secondary literature at all, I will offer my own interpretation of the 
contents of V dA. I intend in this section to introduce important textual points that will 
come up again later, and to dispel an illusion that many scholars hold: 'Leibniz never 
says anything positive in this text'. I will trace Leibniz's line of argument against the so-
called Lazy Reason or any similar fatalist dogma, boiling it down to the neat slogan that 
foreknowledge is not predestination. That is, God's knowing how something will turn out 
is merely epistemic, not causal. Then, I will extract some defmitions of possibility and 
necessity from VdA. It is these definitions that form the bulk ofLeibniz's positive 
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contribution. But, like Socrates demolishing false views so that room can be made for the 
true ones, much of V dA is spent focusing on bringing Leibniz's readers to a state of 
aporia. However, in doing so and expounding his reasons for doing so, Leibniz does 
imply some desiderata for a theory of evil. 
Essentially the Lazy Reason argument boils down to this: 
(a) Whatever God foresees must happen or cannot not happen. 
(b) God foresees that I shall be damned. 
(c) Therefore, my damnation is inevitable or will happen no matter what I 
do. 
Some people have used this fatalist argument as an excuse to be lazy, thinking that they 
have no control over what happens because what will happen will happen no matter what. 
In an uncharacteristically invective-laden passage, Leibniz calls these people fools 
"destined to poverty and ... negligence" and demands that they "pay attention".9 He says 
that "sin is found only in the will", and an evil will deserves punishment. 10 This means 
that "someone asleep or drunk does not sin where there is no will"; moreover, it implies 
that if there is a will but no corresponding action, there is still sin. 11 Although this is a 
strict definition of sin, it does mean that the sinner has strong control over whether he 
sins. Also, this view stresses human responsibility. Even when Leibniz imagines his 
whiny interlocutor asking, "Why didn't God make me better so that I don't sin at all?", he 
counters with, "here I am not obliged to answer you; it is enough that you did not want to 
9 A.VI.i 542 
10 Ibid. 
11 A.VI.i 542 
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give up your sinning and take responsibility for your salvation". 12 Although such 
posturing could be interpreted as deflecting, as Leibniz covering up the fact that he can't 
answer the question, I think we can be charitable here. Leibniz wants to stress the fact 
that humans can do nothing about God or the nature of the universe; however, they do 
have control over their own will. Thus, it is unproductive to rail against what they cannot 
change and ignore what they can. 
But Leibniz does dismiss the syllogism in a more philosophical manner. In order to 
explain the error committed by those who accept its reasoning, he introduces the 
following definition of possibility: 
(Pl): Ifx is possible, x can be clearly explained without confusion and without 
contradiction. 
Leibniz intends to distinguish causal possibility from epistemic knowledge. For the 
purposes of the syllogism, the knowledge in question is God's foreknowledge. What he 
does is plug in his definition of possibility to show that the syllogism fails. Thus Leibniz 
must take the phrase "must happen or cannot not happen" as the phrase where the 
equivocation occurs. However, it looks as though Leibniz uses a different, albeit related, 
definition of possibility to make the substitution: 
(P2): If x is possible, x can be imagined. 
This definition comes from Leibniz's modification of the first premise of the syllogism, 
12 Ibid. 
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(a), to read, "Whatever God foresees, I cannot imagine not happening, that is, I cannot 
imagine it even ifl want to"Y This is obviously not true; we can imagine all sorts of 
things happening which will not happen and which God foresees will not happen. 
Moreover, this definition of possibility, along with the others Leibniz provides, all seek to 
expand the sphere of possibilities beyond the sphere of necessities. If everything that is 
possible equals everything that is necessary, then the world is necessitarian. However, if 
the range of possibilities is wider than the range of necessities, necessitarianism can be 
avoided. Part of Leibniz's argument against the Lazy Reason is his claim that people who 
believe in the Lazy Reason fully identify the possible with the necessary. What his 
definitions of possibility do is establish how something can be possible (that is, able to be 
done or remain undone), how something can be impossible, and how something can be 
necessary. Something can be impossible either because of a logical truth preventing it 
from being possible, or because of context. For instance, if the sentence 'Sarah is a 
bachelor' is evaluated, one can judge that it is impossible for Sarah to be a bachelor 
because Sarah is female. This differs from the example in which 'Jones is a bachelor' is 
impossible because he is married. The first set of cases are necessarily impossible, 
whereas the second set are relative. The important point is the relationship of the sphere 
of necessities to the sphere of possible and impossible. There are some things that are 
possible necessarily, and some things that are impossible necessarily, but the sphere of 
possibles, whether they are actual or not, does not just consist in necessities. This is due 
to the distinction between necessary- and context-dependent possibilities/impossibilities. 
The context-dependent possibilities are defined by circumstance. Jones could have 
13 A.VI.i 540 
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remained a bachelor or gotten married; because he is married, it is not possible for him 
(at this moment) to be a bachelor, but he had free will in his choice and chose to be 
married. 
There is still a worry about the nature ofPl and P2. Leibniz defines the possible as able 
to be explained clearly and non-contradictorily. Although the latter seems to be moving 
us towards a formal definition, the former is epistemic. If everything that happens 
happens for a reason, then all the possibles must have a rational explanation. It is clear 
that explaining something rationally involves a cognitive process, in this case translated 
as imagination [einbilden]. However, even understanding imagination as a technical 
process can't extricate us from our trouble. 14 It seems we are still bound by our own 
cognitive limitations. Perhaps what Leibniz means is that a perfect being correctly 
discerns all the possibles from all the impossibles. But if that is the case, it's not clear 
how close an approximation our imagination can be. It is arguable that Leibniz could 
have skipped straight to the difference between prescience and predetermination (that is, 
he could have defined those two concepts rather than import a digressive definition of 
possibility into his argument). However, it is important to recall that Leibniz is singling 
out the category of things you can't imagine even if you want to as a guide to 
impossibility, whether circumstantial or logical. 
14 I suggested to Brandon Look, the translator of this text, that Leibniz was aiming at a neo-Scholastic 
notion of 'imagination' in using the word einbilden, perhaps following the lead of a German textbook. 
Because, to express Look's own sentiment, "Leibniz just didn't write enough in German for us to know 
what's happening here", he suggested I look in Grimm's Worterbuch. I plan to take up this point in a 
later section, but it seems as though einbilden is a German term for the technical Scholastic Latin 
'imaginare', which is tied up in theories of scholastic mental representation. 
11 
The third substitution makes it even easier to see that the first premise is false. The 
definition is: 
(P3): Ifx is possible, x can remain undone. 
The modified premise then becomes, "What will happen will not remain undone, even if 
God wanted it not to happen". 15 This contradicts God's omnipotence, and it gets at 
Leibniz's main criticism-namely, that "will happen" is different than "must happen". 
God's foreseeing an event means that it will happen, but it does not mean that God's 
foreseeing it is its cause. The case for the distinction can be run in purely human terms: 
Say that you have a friend named Josh. Josh is arachnophobic, and you have witnessed 
this firsthand. Tonight our hapless protagonist will encounter a spider in his apartment. 
You know exactly what will happen when he sees it; in fact, if I told you where he would 
encounter it and whether he was with anyone, you could probably map out the resulting 
scene for me. But, none ofthat knowledge makes Josh do those actions. You have no 
control over him. In fact, if you could make Josh do things, you would make him 
overcome his crippling phobia. The separation between knowing something will happen 
and making it happen is easier to see in this case, because it doesn't involve an 
omnipotent, omniscient being. But the analogy transfers nonetheless. God too sees what 
Josh will do. But he does not cause it. This is something that Leibniz insists even if God 
did create the world and the circumstances because of which Josh became arachnophobic 
and each particular instance in which Josh must confront a spider. Despite it seeming as 
though we have no choice in the matter, we do have free will. Thus, Leibniz believes that 
15 A. Vl.i 541 
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God can know everything we will do and be responsible for providing the means, so to 
speak, but he insists that "what depends upon your will is up to you". 16 This notion may 
be unsatisfying given that God could have changed the circumstances so that the sinner 
never had the opportunity to sin, but although Leibniz mentions this possibility, his 
answer is just to insist that free will mitigates all of the pseudo-determinism imposed by 
God. It is true that this answer is somewhat unsatisfying, but at the same time it's unclear 
how Leibniz could have better answered this challenge given the short length of V dA and 
the rough nature of its philosophy. 
However, there is one final point that I will make about its philosophy. Leibniz has been 
advocating the view that equating what is possible with what is necessary (and only what 
is necessary) is false. But from his definitions of possibility we can glean a definition of 
necessity because all necessary things must be possible. Because Leibniz essentially 
worked his way through three progressive definitions of possibility which began as a 
purely epistemic concept (both Pl and P2link conceivability with possibility) and ended 
as a purely metaphysical one, we can ignore the first two definitions and skip to the third 
one (since the first two definitions involve cognitive limitations): 
(N3): lfx is necessary, x cannot help but be done (even if one does not want to do 
it). 
Thus, to summarize, here are the resulting definitions of possibility and necessity in V dA, 
which lead to mutually exclusive spheres of impossible and possible, but a sphere of 
necessary that is smaller than the sphere of the possible: 
16 A.VI.i 542 
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(Pl): lfx is possible, x can be clearly explained without confusion and without 
contradiction. 
(Nl): Ifx is necessary, x cannot help but be clearly explained without confusion 
and without contradiction. 
(P2): Ifx is possible, x can be imagined. 
(N2): Ifx is necessary, x cannot be imagined not to be. 
(P3): If x is possible, x can be done (if one wants to do it). 
(N3): lfx is necessary, x cannot help but be done. 
The gap is most visible in P3 and N3. N3 says that the necessaries must be done, whereas 
the possibles can or cannot be done. Therefore, what is possible is different than what is 
necessary, so people who believe in the Lazy Reason are mistaken. 
Before explicating the rest ofVdA, I'd like to skip back to the title for one second. The 
work is called 'Von der Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes und der Freiheit des 
Menschen'. Translated that means, 'On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and 
the Freedom of Man'. But why would Leibniz name his work thus? My suggestion is 
twofold, given the problems in reconciling the two. Leibniz wants to exorcise us of the 
misperception that we have no free will given God's power and omniscience. Most of 
that work is done in arguing against historical or folk philosophy positions. However, the 
definitions that I have teased out of the text should also give some sign ofLeibniz's 
positive position. 
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Consider the third set of definitions. Because these relate most closely to doing and not 
mere cognition, it is easier to get a decent concept of free will from this set, though it can 
be done for the others. Free will is not exercised in cases where x is necessary. Thus, by 
negating N3, we get: 
(FW): xis done freely iffx can be done or not be done. 
FW both prevents someone willing x freely when xis necessary, and someone willing 
not-x freely when xis impossible. For instance, say Jocasta desires that there not be any 
bishops in Thebes (during her reign). It is impossible that there be any bishops in Thebes, 
so her desire is satisfied. Leibniz would say that Jocasta did not have it in her power to 
make there be bishops in Thebes if she had willed there to be some; thus, she did not 
exercise free will in this case. However, given Leibniz's rejection of middle knowledge 
(which I will discuss in the next section), free will cannot be understood as perfect 
indifference; Leibniz doubts that such a thing exists. Rather, free will can be exercised in 
a case where the best choice is unclear due to cognitive limitations, conflicting reasons or 
lack of decisive information. Due to Leibniz's dependence on reason, he must say that 
given an ideal reasoner, there would never be a choice scenario between two competing 
options. If perfect indifference is impossible, then no two options are equal. 
However, this applies even in cases where the best option is unclear-that is, there 
always is a better choice and a worse one. So even if one is not an ideal reasoner and will 
sometimes make the wrong choice, there is a definitive 'right' and 'wrong'. Moreover, that 
means that there is an ideal path to be taken through life for everyone, making the 
15 
concept of free will even narrower because rationality dictates a clear life path. Although 
this does mean that Leibniz has boxed himself into an Augustinian-style view where free 
will is only truly exercised to one's own detriment, I think Leibniz himself would 
respond that this isn't objectionable at all. 17 (He can say that we have free will all of the 
time, but the only actions we can perform without the concord of God and/or reason are 
less desirable than their alternatives). However, someone acting based on ideal 
justifications would maximize the happiness of his life and minimize the evil. Leibniz 
would say that even the ideal reasoner who can always see the best alternative still has 
free will when making choices, even if he can only really choose one of them. 
Rejection of Historical Theories 
The two major historical views that Leibniz rejects are those of privation theory and 
middle knowledge. Privation theory is a standard medieval strategy that makes sense of 
evil as a means to a greater good. Thus God's benevolent character can be preserved, 
while leaving room for human responsibility and free will. As Leibniz characterizes it: 
(1) Sin is a nothing. 
(2) Sin consists in the lack of an appropriate perfection. 
(3) God is the cause of all that is real and positive (creatures and actually 
existent things), not the imperfection that causes sin. 
17 This view is presented in works such as 'On the Free Choice of the Will' and states that the only time a 
human acts on his or her own is when he/she acts against God (otherwise there is divine concurrence in 
the action). However, such a view may seem quirky but is relatively common. 
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Leibniz gives two reasons this theory is flawed-first, that this is akin to someone 
causing the number three and denying that he caused its oddness; secondly, that this is 
like saying a bad musician is only responsible for the rhythms and technique of his 
playing, not for the dissonance that results. The core idea behind his examples is, 
essentially, that one cannot split up causation so that one is responsible for the doughnut 
but not the doughnut hole, despite being responsible for the shape of the doughnut. More 
generally, this picture of causation involves an unnatural separation. 
But there is more to criticize here. Leibniz says that, if the bad musician case is true, then 
how can we hold the musician himself responsible? If the musician doesn't cause the 
dissonance, then it seems that no one does since it is a privation, a nonbeing. Freeing 
himself from the analogy, Leibniz follows with, "Indeed, I do not see why one holds the 
sinner himself to be a cause of sin; he does the deed ... and who can do anything about the 
fact that this deed is not in harmony with the love ofGod?"18 The sinner seems to have 
no control over his sin under this view; in Leibniz's own words, "no concurrence or 
influx ... takes place". 19 God certainly not is the cause of the sin, but neither is the sinner. 
How can a sinner cause a nonbeing or privation? 
Leibniz closes the passage by saying, "And it surprises me that the profound Descartes 
stumbled here too".20 As shown by his comments on the Principles of Philosophy, 
Leibniz thinks that Descartes has adopted this unrealistic picture of divine concurrence. 
In the Principles Descartes says our free will allows us to "withhold our assent in 
18 A.VI.i 544-545 
19 Ibid. 545 
20 Ibid. 
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doubtful matters and thus avoid error".21 Leibniz's objection is that free will isn't a 
cognitive power of agreeing or disagreeing, but a power to perform actions.22 Likewise, 
when Descartes distinguishes the intellect from the will and imputes sinning to the latter, 
Leibniz contradicts him. 23 As we have seen, free will for Leibniz involves the intellectual 
power of judging a course of action and then acting upon it (or choosing not to act). 
Therefore it involves both the intellect and the will. In Descartes, freedom of the will is 
merely a function of assenting or dissenting to a course of action. However Leibniz 
believes that this conception of freedom of the will isn't strong enough to counteract 
God's determinism because when we assent we're concurring with God and it's unclear 
what happens when we dissent. Although this explanation is sufficient to explain 
Leibniz's remark, I will delay further discussing notions of concurrence until a later 
section. 
Leibniz then turns to discussing a flawed theory of the will. Its error lies in that it seeks to 
give men freedom of indifference-that is, the freedom to choose between two equal 
options (think of the Buridan's ass problem). For Leibniz, this is worse than endorsing a 
senseless theory, because it "removes God from His own nature" as first and last cause in 
an attempt to preserve his justice.24 Not only is there no sufficient reason to choose 
between one thing and the other, which is unacceptable to Leibniz, but it destroys God's 
foreknowledge. If all things are equal, then God cannot know what the outcome of a 
choice will be beforehand. Leibniz mentions that Fonseca and Molina tried to resolve this 
21 CSM I 194 (AT 8A; 6) 
22 G.iv 356 
23 G.iv361 
24 A.VI.i 545 
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question by positing a sort of "middle knowledge' where God intuitively knows what 
choice will be made, but Leibniz rails against this as well, exclaiming ""0 blind people!" 
and claiming that all those scholars did was give a new name to God's knowledge. 
In the last substantial section ofVdA, Leibniz addresses both of these problems. Leibniz 
takes us to Ziklag and back, quotes some V ergil, and again chastises us for our fallacy in 
believing false theories. Although Leibniz is non-necessitarian, he does not believe in 
middle knowledge, which is a way to preserve God's prescience while allowing for cases 
of perfect indifference. Essentially, God has an intuition about which option will be 
chosen in those cases. But Leibniz argues that such a theory curtails God's omniscience, 
using the example of Ziklag. If some decisions are totally indifferent, how can God know 
what option will be chosen? Either he knows, in which case it is part of his knowledge, or 
he does not. Middle knowledge assumes there is an intermediate ground between those 
two options, which seems infeasible. 
The example ofZiklag (really Keilah, but Leibniz misnamed it) is tied into both ofthe 
sophisms that Leibniz seeks to defeat--concurrence because this conception gives too 
much power to free will, at the expense of God's character; the lazy reason because it 
implies that in cases where humans have free will, God cannot know what the outcome of 
a choice will be beforehand (again conflating predestination with prescience). Although 
this passage ofVdA is opaque in many respects, it seems to show what I've said above: 
namely, that prescience has no causal role in determining events. God sees all the 
possibilities and, due to the circumstances in which they arise, can foresee what you will 
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freely choose. Anyone who thinks God's prescience mandates a deterministic universe is 
making a category mistake. 
Other Aspects of V dA 
There are some other notable parts of V dA, all of which will be relevant in later 
discussions. First of all, the dialogue begins with Leibniz proclaiming grandiosely, "Of 
all the questions that bewilder [ verwirret] the human race, none is pursued with more 
passion, more often repeated, more dangerously and cruelly pressed than this point of 
contention: 'how the free will of man, punishment, and reward can exist, given the 
omnipotence and omniscience of an all-ruling God'".Z5 Leibniz believes that the problem 
has been exacerbated by the use of near-meaningless labels and pledges to use the 
German language in order to banish "philosophical chimeras".26 This is one ofVdA's 
ironic moments, both because Leibniz himself seems to abandon the purity of German in 
order to talk in the language of chimeras and because the text is, unlike the usual Leibniz, 
very flowery and verbose. However, I think it is perhaps more surprising that Leibniz 
tried to philosophize in German than that he ultimately abandoned the idea, due to his 
eirenical nature. As an eclectic who enjoyed the idea of reconciliation, he was already 
aware that adopting a people's language helped to smooth the path (consider his thoughts 
on substantial forms). 
25 A.VI.i 537 
26 Ibid. 538 
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Sections three through five offer some ofLeibniz's positive views as well as hints as to 
his motivations. First, Leibniz believes that God is just and distributes punishments and 
rewards fairly, "as it were according to musical rules"?7 Perhaps it appears in this life 
that this is not so, but Leibniz reminds the reader that this life isn't all there is, and that 
the gifts of this lifetime are trivial when compared with the gifts of the next. Secondly, 
Leibniz alludes to the dread Turkish "chain of ... unavoidable necessity", which is the 
strong determinism that he wants desperately to avoid?8 Lastly, Leibniz mentions the 
Manichaeans and the Pelagians, two groups which he will rail against in the Theodicy, 
though the passage here is nearly incoherent and serves mainly to advance his argument 
that labels are confusing. 
I will retread the lazy reason objection, mostly to point out some theologically-inclined 
remarks. In an uncharacteristically invective-laden passage, Leibniz calls his audience 
fools "destined to poverty and ... negligence" and demands that they "pay attention".29 
Leibniz lays out a succinct view of sin and human responsibility. In V dA, "sin is found 
only in the will", and an evil will deserves punishment.30 This means that "someone 
asleep or drunk does not sin where there is no will"; moreover, it implies that if there is a 
will but no corresponding action, there is still sin. 31 Although this is a strict definition of 
sin, it does mean that the sinner has strong control over whether he sins. Moreover, this 
view stresses human responsibility. Even when Leibniz imagines his interlocutor asking, 
"Why didn't God make me better so that I don't sin at all?", he counters with, "here I am 
27 Ibid. 537 
28 Ibid. 
29 A.VI.i 542 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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not obliged to answer you; it is enough that you did not want to give up your sinning and 
take responsibility for your salvation". 32 Although such posturing could be interpreted as 
deflecting, as Leibniz covering up the fact that he can't answer the question, I think we 
can be charitable here. Leibniz's aim is to unmask the falsehoods that ordinary people 
believe, and thus far he has delved into philosophy only to defeat those falsehoods. 
Giving a complicated answer (which the question would surely demand) would just derail 
him from his task (and perhaps he intended to give one later on in the dialogue). At this 
point, he hasn't exorcised all the demons from his audience's mind; moreover, he has 
already hinted at an answer to this question in section three, where he says that the idea of 
a benevolent God is compatible with less-than-perfect humans. 
However, in the next section he relaxes this strong stance by saying, "nevertheless, the 
wisdom of God must still be justified" per se, even if God doesn't owe an answer to a 
specific person. 33 Leibniz agrees that God could have "arranged it that the person would 
never come to will to sin and fall into sin and damnation"; likewise, Leibniz's God does 
more than spectate-he foresaw all the consequences of our actions and he created the 
circumstances in which they would occur.34 Moreover, it seems that after the Biblical fall, 
God could have started over, creating a new race of men rather than proceeding with the 
race descended from Adam and Eve. Therefore, there is a significant worry that God is 
responsible for sin. Leibniz summarizes the worry: 
(a) He who knowingly permits sin, creates all the opportunities for sin, and 
brings it about that the agent can do it, indeed, provokes the will of the agent 
32 Ibid. 
33 A.VI.i 542 
34 Ibid. 
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itself, and brings it about that he wants to do it-while he nevertheless could 
hinder the sin, indeed, could refrain from creating the opportunities and provoking 
the will-is to be considered the author of sin. 
(b) God does such a thing, as has been shown. 
(c) Therefore he is to be considered the author of sin. 
However, Leibniz addresses this with the use of some a posteriori facts. Because sins 
exist in the world, God must believe that it is better that they exist. God's wisdom 
determines that he wills the best; thus, a world with sin must be the best. But the case is 
in fact stronger than that-God gives humans the ability to sin, and created the particular 
circumstances in which each sin occurs. So far this account is very general and could be 
imputed to the entire tradition of Christian evil theorists. Essentially the problem is how 
to understand God's participation in human actions. Giving too much power to God 
prevents a world in which humans have significant free will and moves towards an 
occasionalist picture; giving too little power to God undermines the conception of God. 
But sense must be made of the fact that God does provide humans with the ability and 
circumstances of sin while pinning the blame for sin on the sinner rather than on God. It 
should also be clear that, given that God wills the best and that sins exist, sins must 
somehow contribute to the bestness of the world; otherwise, the world instantiated would 
be sinless. This notion is usually called 'evil as a means'-the idea that evil in itself is 
bad, but that the work it does in the world is necessary and, in some sense, good. 
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Thus there seem to be certain ideas at work in VdA, even ifLeibniz doesn't present 
views per se. Leibniz's critique of historical theories, and his work with necessity and 
possibility, boils down to one desire: balancing God's power and human freedom. Any 
theory that does not achieve that perfect balance point, where we have significant free 
will but God's character is preserved, must be scrapped. There is an additional idea that 
could count as a positive view, but at the very least marks out what Leibniz sees as a 
necessary criterion for any theory of evil-the idea that evil is a means to a greater good 
(also called the greater good defense). Leibniz believes it is a fact known through 
experience that sins exist. Thus, God must have wanted sins to exist. Because God is 
wise, he wills the best, so the actual world must be the best. Therefore, the world's sins 
must contribute to its bestness. In such a scenario, evil is used as a means to obtaining a 
greater good, and, like the saying 'the end justifies the means', its existence becomes 
excusable. In fact this general picture of evil is at work in many historical theories, 
because there is no better way to explain the existence of evil. However, given that 
Leibniz does not elucidate a full theory of evil in V dA, it's unclear exactly how he intends 
the idea of evil as a means to be used. 
Connections to Other Early Writings 
Before turning to the Confessio and the work of Leibniz scholars, I'd like to talk about 
VdA's relationship with a couple of other early works on evil. I have already noted the 
similarities between V dA and 'L' auteur du peche' in passing, but I want to make it 
explicit. Other important reiterations include a passage on middle knowledge and some 
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passing remarks about free will and evil. Unfortunately, the dating of these early 
fragments is not reliable, despite the Sleigh volume and the German editions providing 
reasonable best guesses-thus, it is nearly impossible to know whether, for instance, the 
statements on the author of sin and middle knowledge made in Latin and French are 
scraps of material for VdA or aspects taken from VdA and written up in Leibniz's 
preferred languages. However, all ofthe pieces collected in the Yale Confessio volume 
are worthwhile; for instance, a quote from the Wedderkopf Letter supports the V dA 
conception of free will:35 
Fate is the decree of God or the necessity of events. Fatal things are those that will 
necessarily happen. God either does not decree concerning everything, or, if he 
does decree concerning everything, then he is the author of absolutely everything. 
This quote and the subsequent discussion demonstrate Leibniz's keen awareness that God 
must be prescient without taking away free will, and yet somehow God must be absolved 
of responsibility for sin. As we know from V dA, Leibniz settles on the view that God 
doesn't decree concerning everything but he still knows it.36 Furthermore, later on in this 
letter Leibniz echoes his words in V dA that because "God wills the things he perceives to 
be the best and, likewise, the most harmonious", God must have some motivation for 
creating sin (or, minimally, allowing it to exist).37 Thus, Leibniz concludes that "nothing 
is to be considered absolutely evil", because absolute evil's existence would bring into 
question either God's benevolence or his power.38 Although sins are evil to the sinner, 
35 A.II.i 117 
36 Argued for in previous sections. 
37 A.II.i 117 
38 Ibid. 118 
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"taken together with punishment or atonement, sins are good" (in the sense of being 
harmonious).39 So again, we see Leibniz reasoning that, God being God and it being 
evident that sins do exist, the only consistent explanation is some form of the greater 
good defense. 
Most of the other works in the Yale volume are clearly connected with the Confessio 's 
ideas about free will and evil, but still contain useful quotes that show that Leibniz is 
ruminating on the ideas in VdA and expounding them further. However, we don't 
know-and can't know-whether the Confessio 's relationship with V dA is one that 
demonstrates the evolution of some of the concepts in V dA, one that rejects those 
concepts, or one that refines them. In the next section I argue that the evidence is 
inconclusive due to the short length ofVdA, the fact that some ofthe content discussed in 
one work is not discussed in the other, and lastly, because of the brute stylistic 
differences between a work written as a dialogue between a philosopher and a theologian 
and a work written in the style ofVdA. ('Polemical sermon' or 'apology in the sense of 
apologia' come to mind due to the strength of Leibniz's rhetoric). The relevant point here 
is that the works written in the same period as VdA and/or the Confessio do nothing to 
add or subtract from my view. Although Leibniz' s historical rejections remain consistent 
(and in fact, both 'L'auteur du peche' and 'Scientia media' are a good deal more coherent 
than V dA), one cannot base any plausible claims about the evolution of Leibniz 's view on 
two stable rejections. Had Leibniz written a piece that showed he had 'seen the light' and 
'embraced middle knowledge' with open arms, which led to a detailed exposition of a 
view supporting middle knowledge in the Confessio, the narrative might be more clear. 
39 Ibid. 
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But unfortunately, we cannot be inside Leibniz's mind and the dates that we have for 
some of the texts are subjective. 
Before wrapping up this section I would like to point out two obvious connections to 
VdA. Both are important in Leibniz's development because they will be important to the 
late Leibniz. In 'L'auteur du peche', Leibniz reintroduces the problem of the author of 
sin, saying that in order to avoid the idea that God is the author of sin, some thinkers have 
taken up privation theory. If sin is a privation, then God, because he is not the author of 
privations, is not the author of sin. Another way to put the thesis is by saying that God is 
responsible for the physical aspect, not the moral aspect (where the moral aspect is 
understood as an anomie, a lawlessness). Leibniz calls this strategy "a manifest 
illusion ... a leftover from the visionary philosophy of the past" and "a subterfuge with 
which a reasonable person will never be satisfied".40 To explicate his objection he uses 
the example of a painter. The painter paints two identical paintings, but one is a miniature 
and the other is not. According to this theory, the miniature's positive features-the 
colors, lines, etc-are the responsibility of the painter, but "its privative aspect", the 
diminishment with respect to the larger painting, is not.41 To say this is ridiculous. As 
Leibniz says, "the privation is nothing but a simple result or infallible consequence of the 
positive aspect, without requiring a separate author".42 Moreover, if privation really has 
no author, then how can man be held responsible for sin? Man cannot be the sole 
architect of the positive aspects of sin, so even if one holds that the same agent must be 
40 A.VI.iii 150-151 
41 A.VI.iii 151 
42 Ibid. 
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responsible for the positive and privative aspects, it cannot be man. Thus Leibniz 
concludes that this theory is incoherent and fails to provide the desired conclusion. 
The bad musician example from V dA and the painter example from this text are very 
similar, although the bad musician is easier to explain. Furthermore, Leibniz makes the 
same move in 'L'auteur' as he did in VdA, saying, "Indeed, I do not see why one holds 
the sinner himself to be a cause of sin; he does the deed ... and who can do anything about 
the fact that this deed is not in harmony with the love ofGod?"43 This theory, which he 
calls 'privation theory', is what I will call 'separation theory' in order to distinguish it 
from a different type of privation theory that will be introduced shortly. Leibniz has much 
disdain for this theory, going so far as to call its conclusions "ajoke",44 ''unsound" and 
"lame".45 However, 'L'auteur' does make the character of separation theory clearer, 
hammering home Leibniz's points on the matter. 
Likewise, 'Scientia media' takes up and then dismisses the possibility of middle 
knowledge. However, this is a case where Leibniz is much clearer in his justifications. He 
is much more adamant that "nothing exists without a reason", which he says has 
application in "[ending] many controversies in metaphysics" (including, of course, this 
mistaken conception of freedom).46 If such is the case, then middle knowledge is 
impossible, because ''the will cannot choose between two objects unless the goodness of 
43 A.VI.i 544-545 
44 A.VI.iii 151 
45 A. VI.i 544 
46 A.VI.iv 1373 
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one of them is greater".47 Ergo, if a man were confronted with two absolutely equal-
seeming options he would be unable to decide between them and forced to reserve 
judgment until the reasons for picking one or the other became more apparent. 
Though neither of these texts introduce new concepts, they certainly expand upon the 
hurried arguments in V dA and show that Leibniz is, if nothing else, systematically testing 
his objections by examining their metaphysical underpinnings. Thus, from the particular 
objection to middle knowledge we see his adherence to the PSR, and from his objection 
to separation theory we see that he is inclined to espouse a version of the greater good 
defense. Moreover, it appears that on subsequent revisits to the topic in general, his 
writing became sharper, which will culminate in his book on evil, the Theodicy. 
To conclude this section and previous sections, I want to summarize what I have already 
done. I have extracted some definitions from V dA which allowed me to posit a tentative 
conception of free will. After noting the objections to privation theory and middle 
knowledge which were further developed in subsequent texts, I also introduced the 
conception of 'separation theory' as a type of privation theory. Moreover, there were 
some other aspects ofVdA that were noteworthy, such as Leibniz's appeal to the greater 
good defense, his idea that sins do exist in the world, and his objection to the lazy reason. 
I also briefly discussed the idea of what evolutionary conclusions we can draw from 
V dA, saying that it is conjecture to make any strong conclusions about its relationship 
with the Confessio and other early works on evil. This point will be taken up in the next 
section; several others will be explicated later on. 
47 Ibid. 1374 
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The Confessio and Scholarly Interpretations 
It is now time to look at scholarly interpretations of V dA. I intend not only to put these 
views on the table, but to use them against each other in order to examine whether the 
view presented in the Confessio differs significantly from that of V dA. Ultimately, 
though I deny all of their interpretations, there are points of value to be taken from all the 
scholars who have taken the time to discuss this topic. 
Sleigh's view is the easiest to discuss, although certain aspects of it have to wait until I 
discuss the shift in Leibniz' s thought that occurs in the 1680s. At both points this will 
seem a bit unfair to Sleigh, because his view is no different than the view held by many 
others; however, he is the only one who seems to have written it down (both in his 
introduction to the Yale volume and in a couple of articles). Thus he is my exemplar for 
this line of thought, which assumes that V dA and the Confessio explicate a continuous 
position. That being said, however, no one appears to have contradicted his 
interpretations. Part of the problem stems from the fact that Leibniz's work on evil is 
rather neglected. As I said previously, the Theodicy is generally thought of as a quotation 
mine; however, it has only been recently that studying Leibniz's early works has become 
popular. Thus, in general even works that seem to directly involve the problem of evil, 
such as Robert Adams' famous book Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist (a book in 
which two of the three main topics directly engage with evil), seem to skirt around the 
topic when there is much to be gained from considering it. 
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But back to Sleigh. In "Leibniz's First Theodicy' Sleigh is specifically addressing the 
Confessio philosophi. The article title might lead one to think that Sleigh is discussing the 
relationship between the Confessio and the Theodicy, the word "theodicy' which was 
coined by Leibniz for his eponymous book, or something similar. However, as Sleigh 
writes: 
The central thesis of the paper is that Leibniz formulated a solution to the author 
of sin problem in the Confessio that he came to believe to be inadequate and that 
recouping his losses subsequently involved him in tangled metaphysical 
considerations .. .I have no more than moderate confidence in this thesis. 48 
I too have no more than moderate confidence in this thesis, but objections to Sleigh's 
analysis ofLeibniz's development must be saved for the next section. What is relevant 
right now is Sleigh's verdict on VdA, which he encapsulates in one paragraph: 
By the close of paragraph 19 ... Leibniz believed that he had dispensed with the 
leading moves ofhis predecessors concerning the problem ofthe author of sin. 
We might expect Leibniz's positive contribution to be located in section 20, the 
last section of the work. 49 
48 Sleigh 481 
49 Ibid. 486 
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Instead Sleigh quotes the final three words of the work and concludes that ''the positive 
solution [to the problems posed by V dA] was the work of the Confessio" rather than 
something that Leibniz presented in V dA itself. 50 
Sleigh's analysis ofVdA does good historical work. It highlights the connection to 
Molina, a late Scholastic, through Leibniz's rejection of middle knowledge. As Sleigh 
says, "Leibniz therein rejected this solution [Molina's libertarian account] for three 
reasons"-the first two were standard reasons given by Molina's own critics; the third 
stemmed from his own commitment to "a theory of causal determinism and 
compatibilism" which was inconsistent with Molina's libertarianism. 51 His account also 
traces the roots of privation theory and deems it a Thomastic/ Augustianian hybrid by 
invoking quotations from the Summa. 52 However, Sleigh says nothing about the positive 
work of V dA. In fact, by treating it thus, he implies that there is no 'positive 
contribution'. Furthermore, treating one work as an aporetic precursor to the other's 
positive contributions makes them a package deal. While it could be the case that the 
Corifessio and V dA are part of a set of compatible works that Leibniz wrote on the 
problem of evil (which at least some of the other works such as his pieces on middle 
knowledge and the author of sin seem to suggest), it should be clear by now that I think 
there is a lot of material in V dA, especially relative to its size. Sleigh has just assumed 
that the positions in the two works are compatible. 
50 Sleigh 486 
51 Ibid. 484 
52 Medieval philosophers may want to underscore the fact that both philosophers have differing accounts 
of evil and free will, but for our purposes it is only important to recognize the theory and its roots as 
Leibniz perceived it. 
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By contrast, Rateau's account goes in the other direction. He thinks there is much to be 
found in V d.A. Though he concedes that the majority of the interest in V dA lies in its 
treatment of traditional solutions, he adds that the text acknowledges the difficulties 
posed by rational theology. 53 That is, in explaining God's justice, one must explain how 
an omnipotent and omniscient God nonetheless leaves a metaphysical space for human 
free will. For Rateau, the importance ofthe project of rationalizing theology cannot be 
understated, since he believes that Leibniz worked towards giving a rationalized account 
all his life. However, he supplements his consideration of the material with outside 
evidence, which leads him to draw conclusions that I see as lacking in the text. 
For Rateau, Vd.A and the Confessio are very far apart indeed; Vd.A is "more 
necessitarian" than the Confessio due to the greater influence on Leibniz of Luther and 
Hobbes. Although it is true that Leibniz was (at least nominally) Lutheran and that he 
was influenced by Hobbes at this time, Rateau makes this point without explicating the 
'necessiatarianism' ofVd.A and his only evidence for the influence of Luther and Hobbes 
is the fact that both men lambasted the historical positions objected to in Vd.A. Now, even 
though the enemy of my enemy is my friend, that doesn't mean that you and the enemy 
of your enemy share the same positive philosophy, and for someone whose analysis of 
Vd.A's positive content is so rich and worthwhile, it's a disappointment for Rateau to 
conclude his account as he does. While it could be the case that Rateau has studied 
Luther and Hobbes in depth and thus has more reasons for tracing out this line of 
influence, then my criticism would be that he has not illuminated these reasons for the 
uninformed reader (in this case, me). 
53 Rateau 104 
33 
Thus, there is no doubt that the Confessio is an expansion of the material of V dA-the 
question is whether there are significant incompatibilities between the two works. My 
answer on this may be unsatisfactory, but I think it ultimately the most prudent: we just 
don't, and can't know. V dAis too short; the more assumptions we make about its 
background metaphysics, the less objective our interpretation will become. This is why I 
think Rateau goes too far. 
For instance, consider this sketch of the similarity between the two. The Confessio 's main 
view is that God wills the best. Being the cause of all things, God wills a certain series of 
events into existence. However, he could have willed a different series into existence. 
Thus, the world is non-necessitarian and we are free. 54 It can be extrapolated from 
Leibniz's remarks in VdA that we exercise free will in cases with sufficient rational 
causes. Moreover, Leibniz relies heavily on the existence of a chain of causes that 
extends back to God and contains justifications for all actual things. However, should be 
go even further and assume that a 'chain of causes' is similar to the 'series of events' 
enacted by God in the Confossio? 
On the one hand, a significant case could be made for reading this view into V d.A-
Leibniz doesn't want to destroy the chain of causes from God, and given that all causes 
must be sufficient and rational, we could make the case that Sleigh makes for the 
Confessio. God can only will the best, so if God exists, then the actual series ofthings is 
tied to God's existence. Constrained to will the best, God effectively must actualize one 
54 Explained at A.VI.iii 126. 
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specific series of events. Thus, due to contextual constraints rather than logical necessity, 
the series of events that exists, exists necessarily. Therefore, the Confessio picture is 
necessitarian, and his recourse to per se necessity (that is, that considered in itself, 
without God, the actual series of things isn't necessary) just isn't satisfying. It's like 
saying that being born to an abusive mother doesn't necessarily dictate the course of your 
life, because considered per se, your life has many possibilities. However, nothing can 
change the fact that every person who is born must have a mother, and yours is abusive. 
On the other hand, speculation can carry us far away from the content ofVdA. Hence my 
instinct is to say that VelA's content is compatible with that of the Confossio; you can find 
many parallels between the two positions, but the Confossio 's has richer, more developed 
views. You can even accept this for two incompatible reasons: either because you believe 
that Leibniz recognized the paucity of his original account and decided to embellish it, or 
because you believe that had Leibniz continued writing V dA, he would have included the 
essence of what was in the Confessio. Thus, my position on the matter remains skeptical 
until someone who has looked at the material of both texts can make a careful and solid 
argument for one of those conclusions. Personally I don't believe that there is enough 
textual evidence to do this, but I could be proven wrong. We just don't know at this point 
if the Confessio 's views are an explication ofVdA, an evolution ofVdA, or a moving-on 
from VelA. 
Davidson's analysis, although short, is very important. Davidson examines the views of 
V dA and the Corifessio en route to determining whether Leibniz changed his mind 
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between this period and the Theodicy on the issue of human free will. Davidson fmds 
connections between all three works, but laments the loss of the candid thinker of the 
early period while simultaneously noting the disappearance of one of the confusing 
aspects ofthe early works, the evil will. Davidson claims that "Leibniz rejects any 
account of free will according to which acts of willing lack sufficient causes". 55 It is true 
that Leibniz skirts this in section nineteen ("they say that free will is a certain power of a 
rational creature such that it can will this or that without any cause"). 56 However, 
Davidson should have recognized that Leibniz was bound in this case by his own 
principle of rationality: a sufficient cause must have a sufficient reason. Moreover, from 
his talk in earlier sections and his eagerness to separate causation from foreknowledge, it 
seems that Leibniz believes free will only to be exercised in cases of sufficient rationality 
(hence why a drunk or sleeping person cannot sin). 57 As such, Leibniz must reject the 
entire category of cases where there isn't a sufficient reason to act one way or another, 
most likely by saying that those such situations are impossible or that the person involved 
must withhold judgment (note that this holds whether the case is purely psychological or 
not). However, Davidson has a second point, against a claim which he detects both in 
V dA and the Confessio: 
(CW): There is always a cause of the will outside the willing subject's will. 
55 Davidson 22 
56 A.VI.i 545 
57 This is supported by certain passages in 'Scientia media', which Leibniz' s line of reasoning is more 
explicit. (See the above discussion of 'Scientia media'). 
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This point is tied up with his discussion of cases of indifference, but, as Davidson notices, 
it "puts considerable strain on the claim that what depends on your will is up to you". 58 
Unfortunately, Leibniz is in a tight position here; he cannot respond that the will can act 
irrationally. Rather, he must say that the will must always act rationally and choose the 
best, and cases of falling short are due to epistemic failures on the part of the agent. 
However, if this is the case, it is once again difficult to see how an agent satisfyingly 
exercises free will, except in cases where the agent fails to choose the best. For when the 
agent does what is rationally best and has all the cognitive information available to make 
that choice and chooses freely, his will and God's will desire the same thing. What does 
the agent add in these cases? Leibniz must say, given his definition of free will, that here 
the agent's power consists in counterfactually having been able to do otherwise to his 
own detriment. 
Thus, Davidson's fmal verdict on VdA is that Leibniz's making the will the ultimate 
source of sin is voluntarist (because an evil will alone deserves punishment) but that his 
reliance on outside causes for willing is not, an unstable theory which causes Leibniz to 
go on an intellectualist path in the Confossio. As such, he either sees VdA as an early 
view that Leibniz moved on from, or as a predecessor to the Confessio 's view which was 
reworked to deemphasize some troubling aspects. However, Davidson still recognizes 
that the evil will idea is present in the Confessio to some extent. I find Davidson's 
analysis in this respect to be a nonstarter, since the evil will idea, in some form or 
another, is present in the Theodicy. (This will be discussed in the relevant section). 
58 Davidson 24 
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But the merits of Davidson's account are that he is willing to consider V dA in its own 
right and that he doesn't extrapolate too strong a view from the evidence he has, which is 
something that I believe that both Sleigh and Rateau have done. Moreover, despite my 
belief that there just isn't enough evidence (for me at least) to make a conclusion about 
the relationship between V dA and the Conftssio, Davidson does extract an interesting 
definition of free will from the Confessio: 
(FC): "A power that can act and not act, all the requisites for acting having been 
posited, and moreover, all the requisites that exist both outside and inside the 
agent being equal (A VI 3 132)".59 
This looks a lot like the defmition from V dA: 
(FW): x is done freely iff x can be done or not be done. 
The two conditions on the power (that the requisites are in place and that they are 
equalized) are assumed in V dA; the disjunct between acting and not acting is still present. 
Davidson goes on to discuss the explicit intellectualism of the Conftssio and the fact that 
Leibniz is bound by the principle of sufficient reason. A consequence of that is, as I noted 
above, that the best thing that one can do is act in accordance with God. Thus, we can 
safely say that the Confessio and V dA have similar definitions of free will. However, 
unless the underlying metaphysics and modality ofVdA are made explicit, it doesn't 
matter. Leibniz made a habit of reusing old friends, such as the PSR, in new contexts. 
Perhaps it is just coincidental that both works contain a similar definition of free will. 
59 Davidson 26 
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The 1680s (Historical Privation Theory) 
Sleigh's analysis ofLeibniz on evil asserts the following: Leibniz formulated a group of 
"fundamental propositions" at the beginning of his career that stayed with him throughout 
his life. 60 Though "he never rejected any of them, his views about exactly what 
theodicean problems they resolved varied significantly over time". 61 These core 
propositions are: 
(i.) This is the best possible world. 
(ii.) Since, in the long term, sin is harmful only to the sinner, it is not absolutely 
evil. 
(iii.) Whoever has an evil will deserves punishment, whatever the source of the 
evil will. 
(iv.) The ultimate source of evil is in the divine understanding, not in the divine 
will.62 
I disagree with Sleigh's interpretation for several reasons. First of all, holding this view 
biases him towards the idea that Leibniz's development occurs mostly in the early period. 
Thus his implicit interpretation of the Theodicy suggests that all Leibniz is doing in that 
late work is reapplying fully developed theses to different areas of the problem of evil. 
Secondly, the notion that Leibniz used these propositions for radically different things in 
60 Kremer 166. 'Kremer' refers to the volume in which this paper can be found. Because it is an overview 
ofLeibniz's treatment of the problem of evil, this is my go-to paper for citations involving Sleigh's view 
ofLeibniz's development, despite similar quotes populating his other works. 
61 Ibid. 166-167. 
62 Ibid. 166 
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itself implies that they changed over time. Thirdly, even if the words of the propositions 
themselves don't change, their context and meaning does-that is, even if Leibniz holds 
some variant of (i) in both the Confessio and Theodicy periods, affirming (i) in the 
Confessio period amounts to nothing more than a platitude about the goodness and 
excellence of God, whereas affirming it in the Theodicy period alludes to a well-
developed theological modallogic.63 By 1710, the term 'best possible world' has gained 
new meaning; it is a technical term rather than a mere idea. Finally, Sleigh expresses his 
belief that Leibniz's reevaluation of privation theory, along with "a theory of concurrence 
between created agent and God in the production of a creaturely action", allows him to 
formulate the Theodicy's account of evil. If this is the case, then it is questionable how 
much work the four above propositions do on their own-(ii) and (iii) at least seem like 
perfunctory results rather than heavy metaphysical lifters, and (iv) explains how God can 
be benevolent and still allow evil. As such, it is central to explaining the resolution of a 
just God and an unjust world, but it doesn't bear the brunt ofLeibniz's explanation. 
Although this is anticipating my discussion of the Theodicy, what I mean is that (ii) and 
(iii) are not essential to Leibniz's solution to the problem of evil in that book; likewise, 
(iv) is an instrumental part of his theory but becomes meaningless without the support of 
concurrence, privation, and some metaphysical theses such as the idea that the divine 
intellect contains the eternal verities. 64 
Even acknowledging the importance of Leibniz's formulation of privation theory and a 
theory of concurrence sophisticated enough to explain evil, Sleigh's view is that the seeds 
63 A similar split could be made between Confessio (iv.) and Theodicy (iv.). 
64 Presented in Book One, Section 42. 
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of their development happen in the 1680s-papers such as 'De libertate, fato, gratia dei' 
show Leibniz's changing stance on privation theory, and concurrence theory is developed 
as part ofhis discussions of necessity. Thus, even though it looks as though those 
important parts of the Theodicy are developed for the Theodicy, they were not. One might 
feel that this is correct: that the Theodicy, one of the only works Leibniz published in his 
lifetime, was populated with 'safe' theories screened in advanced by acute minds. One 
might even kindly say that this is the culmination of a life's work. But in an era in which 
it has been acknowledged that the Theodicy is more than a citation reservoir for scholars 
who are interested in other things, and when scholars are turning their attention to the 
Theodicy as a work of philosophy in its own right, I think it is necessary to fmd a 
different interpretation of Leibniz's development. 
However, we must start in the 1680s by understanding where Leibniz is coming from. 
Sleigh aptly points out the main problem of the Confessio, which I have alluded to 
earlier: 
(1) The series of things, W, is necessarily enacted. (God can (debatably) choose to 
create W or not to create W, but he is bound, ifhe creates, to create W). "If God is 
taken away, so is the entire series of things, and if God is posited, so is the entire 
series of things." 65 
(2) Evils exist as a means to obtain the best possible series, that is, W. "Whatever 
exists has a sufficient reason for existing";66 "sins occur to bring forth a universal 
65 A Vl.iii 121 
66 Ibid. 118 
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harmony ofthings".67 Leibniz has already defined harmony as a unity in 
multiplicity, some parts of which are not pleasing on their own, but which whole 
is pleasing. 
(3) Evils exist in W. This Leibniz takes as truth from empirical evidence. 
( 4) The evils existing in W are pre-determined (since changing the evils would 
change the series of things). "The sins included in this total series of things" (that 
is, the one that was enacted) "are due to the ideas themselves of things, i.e., to the 
existence of God. In positing this, they are posited; this being taken away, so are 
they".6s 
(5) God exists. Again, a necessary truth; Leibniz refers to "the demonstration of 
the existence of God" as crucial in helping his arguments here. And whatever we 
think of Leibniz's actual beliefs, this is a truth in all his writings. 69 
(C) Each particular evil in W is willed by God. (Ergo, each particular evil is 
necessary). 
Given that God and the series of things are bound together, so that in changing one the 
other changes, it is impossible to have a different series of things. If so, even if God is 
using evil as a means to obtain the best series, it's not just that God is hand-waving and 
allowing some evils into the world the way a boss might excuse a few late arrivals spread 
out over a year of work. If said boss actually knew the reason for the late arrivals, their 
dates and times, and how many there would be, would he be as quick to permit them? 
Even if you try to wiggle out of this example by saying, "Well what if this guy-call him 
67 Ibid. 122 
68 Ibid. 124 
69 Ibid. 120 
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Joe-is an exemplary employee and the boss needs him to have the best company 
possible, even if he's late a few times", you're still stuck with the conclusion that those 
absences are 'necessary', both in the traditional sense (they follow from a necessary thing) 
and in the sense that the boss permits them. Trying to get around this by saying, as 
Leibniz does, that the late arrivals aren't necessary when considered of themselves, but 
only when considered in a greater context, is a weak solution. Thus I agree with Sleigh 
that Leibniz realized the indefensibility of the Confessio and was forced to move on. The 
question is, "How did he move on?" 
Sleigh's answer is simple: Leibniz changed his mind about privation theory in the 1680s. 
In different terms: "ridicule was not Leibniz's last word on privation theory",70 "Leibniz 
was forced thereby to concoct his own complicated version of privation theory", 71 and 
finally, "in his mature treatments ofthe problem ofthe author of sin Leibniz took refuge 
in his own version of privation theory-the theory versions of which were lampooned in 
[V dA and 'L' auteur']". 72 The passage that Sleigh cites is from 'De libertate', where 
Leibniz says the following: 
It seems illusory to say that God concurs in the matter of sin, but not in the formal 
aspect, which is a privation or anomie. But one should know that this response is 
more solid than it seems at first glance, for every privation consists in 
imperfection, and imperfection, in limitation".73 
70 Kremer 170 
71 Ibid. 176 
72 Kremer 178 
73 A VI.iv 1605 
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This passage does espouse a version of privation theory. However, I don't believe it is the 
same version as the one that Leibniz rejects in his early writings. Leibniz endorses a type 
of privation theory, imperfection theory, that differs from the separation theory found, for 
instance, in Augustine. Thus, Sleigh and I agree that the thesis that each creature's 
privative imperfection is the source of its evil and sin, is "central" both to Leibniz's 
contribution to the problem of evil, and to the theory of evil in the Theodicy.14 However, 
we disagree about the characterization of such a thesis. It is up to me to illuminate the 
difference. In short, both theories involve a division of causal labor, meant to impute 
moral responsibility to the creature rather than to God (or any other outside force). 
However, the difference is rooted in an internal/external dichotomy which turns out to be 
key: Separation theory, unlike imperfection theory, can never provide an adequate theory 
of concurrence, and thus, an adequate theory of evil. 
To reestablish separation theory, consider the following quotes: 
(S 1) Sin is a nothing, consisting in a lack of appropriate perfection, which God 
does not cause. God is responsible for all the positive aspects of sin, none of the 
negative. 75 
(S2) It is commonly believed ... that sin in its essence is nothing but a pure 
privation without any reality, and God is not the author of privations. 76 
These both summarize separation theory. However, Leibniz launches two explicatory 
counterexamples: 
74 Kremer 179 
75 Paraphrased from VdA (A Vl.i 544-545). 
76 A Vl.iii 150 
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(Cl) A bad musician is only the cause of the violin bowings and drumbeats and 
not the resulting dissonance ... such an imperfection or dissonance is a nonbeing, a 
negative thing in which no concurrence ... takes place. 77 
(C2) Under this theory, a painter who paints one large painting and a miniature of 
the same would be the author of everything real and positive in the paintings, but 
not of its privative aspect (that is, ofthe small painting's disproportion to the 
larger one). 78 
The counterexamples show the same root objection: whoever is the author of the positive 
aspects cannot help but author the negative ones. It is like saying the baker is responsible 
for the shape of a donut and all of its positive aspects, but not the hole in the middle of 
the donut. In other words, it is as ridiculous as Leibniz makes it out to be. In his book, 
Paul Rateau launches a similar objection to Sleigh's interpretation. First of all, the 'evil' 
which impedes God is not nothing: "il est bien quelque chose: une creature". 79 That is, 
under separation theory, God is prevented from doing what he would do not by a 
nothingness, but by the actions of a creature. Therefore, the title of 'privation theory' 
rings hollow. Even more unfortunate, ifthat is so, then it seems that some of God's 
creations have the power to contradict God's wishes. This may bring us right back to 
objections about God's power. Another problem with this characterization of evil is that 
God's concurrence seems total in this picture; there is no space for human liberty or 
indeed human action at all. (Thus, there is no concurrence, just God acting, with the 
human adding nothing, not even the power of resistance to God's actions). As Rateau puts 
77 A VI.i 545 
78 A VI.iii 151 
79 Rateau 245 
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it, "si Dieu fait le physique du peche, i1 est egalement I' auteur du moral".80 If separation 
theory is right, then we are just God's puppets and we definitely don't have free choice. 
This is anathema to Leibniz given his commitments to reason, human action, and God's 
benevolence. 
Finally, there is an inherent inconsistency between Sleigh's insistence that Leibniz later 
adopts this type of privation theory and Sleigh's assertion that the Confessio suffers from 
causal underperformance. The concurrence problem in the Confessio, as Sleigh points 
out, is twofold. Leibniz holds that each state of affairs owes its existence to causation via 
the understanding or causation via the will, but only those states caused by the will are 
'authored' by God. Lastly, sins are not caused to obtain by the divine will.81 However, 
'causation by divine understanding' literally means that if God exists, then a state of 
affairs a obtains. This actualization, moreover, is necessary if God exists. If that is the 
case, and we understand the notion of'willing' as 'delighting in', then not only can every 
state of affairs be traced back to God's understanding, but the difference between willing 
and permitting is merely that God is somehow 'delighted' by certain states of affairs. 
Though this does show that God neither wills nor takes delight in sin, these notions of 
causation are terribly similar. What does it mean for an eternal, omniscient and 
omnipotent being to 'delight in' a state of affairs? And even if Sleigh's reconstruction of 
the Confessio is faulty, can one find more plausible or clearer definitions of the modes of 
divine causation? Thus, in the Confessio, as in separation theory, God's power seems to 
block the possibility of concurrence or any way to make sense of human free will. 
80 Rateau 246 
81 Taken from Kremer 177. 
46 
Because Leibniz recognized this problem in separation theory as early as V dA and wrote 
about it several times, it seems odd that he would turn to it after the Confessio despite 
being aware of its problematic picture of concurrence. 
It is for these reasons that I believe alongside Rateau that "sans abandoner .. .l'idee d'une 
non-separation du reel et de sa privation, [Leibniz] va proposer une nouvelle doctrine du 
concours, dans laquelle tout 1' acte viendra de Dieu et toute son imperfection de Ia 
creature, limitee originairement". 82 The root of Rateau's critique is the following: in a 
picture in which evil is nothingness and God isn't responsible at all for its existence, how 
can evil have any causal powers? Even worse, how can humans possibly be held 
responsible if God is a domineering causal presence and nothingness picks up the slack? 
This is the heart of Leibniz's objections: this portrayal of evil appears to be external to 
both God and creatures. Moreover, it seems unrealistic because creatures perform the 
evil acts, thus allowing evil to exist. Creatures get in the way of God's maximum 
perfection, not nothing. However, because according to separation theory the 
responsibility for the positive and the privative seem to go together, humans can't be 
responsible for the privative because there is no way without God's help for them to be 
responsible for the positive. 
Imperfection theory improves on separation theory in one simple way: it changes 
'privation' from a general nothingness or unreality to a defect inside a creature. God 
remains perfectly good, but creatures cannot receive their full share of God's goodness. 
Creatures' internal privations are called 'defects', or 'original limitations'. These privations 
82 Rateau 24 7 
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cause creatures to sin; thus sin exists at large, and each individual sin can be blamed on 
some creature. A much better analogy, which illustrates the differences between 
separation theory and imperfection theory, is that of the 'means to an end'-just as an 
artist might use shadows which would be distasteful on their own to enhance the overall 
look of a painting, God uses evil to improve the goodness of the world. 83 In shifting to 
adopt this viewpoint, Leibniz has removed the elements that plague the Confessio 's 
picture of divine causation. However, the good parts (that God's understanding and not 
his will is the cause of sin, that God permits evil but does not delight in it, that God uses 
evil as a means) are retained. This picture--the Theodicy picture--preserves God's causal 
responsibility for the world while leaving a space for human moral responsibility and free 
will. Moreover, it constitutes an optimization of the greater good defense by calibrating it 
with a plausible picture of just how privation of goodness leads to evil. We have seen 
Leibniz committed to the greater good defense from the beginning, as well as a balanced 
picture of divine power and human will. In the Theodicy, Leibniz believes he has found 
the answer to all his desiderata, and, in a way, he has. But of course, the Theodicy's view 
is as flawed as the Corifessio 's in some ways. 
However, this is getting ahead of ourselves. I want to add a brief addendum about 
comparative theories of evil to this section in order to flesh out my distinction between 
separation and imperfection theory with examples. We have already seen that Augustine 
and (arguably) one version of Aquinas are in the separation theory camp. I intend to 
introduce some shorter and sweeter theories to unpack, such as those of Plotinus and 
83 The 'means to an end' defense is Leibniz's own in the Theodicy, though he uses a different example. 
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Descartes. A further strength of this approach is that the weaknesses of both types of 
theories will soon become evident. 
Leibniz scholars may not know or care about the Platonic influence on his philosophical 
works. Christia Mercer has written a book in which she proved, among other things, that 
Leibniz would have had contact with such ideas through several of his teachers, including 
Thomasius. However, Mercer's book neglects the problem of evil, doesn't show the 
impact of Platonism on Leibniz's later works, and doesn't make any textual parallels. 
Thus I ask the reader to keep an open mind as I expound the roots of the theodicean 
tradition. 
In 'On Evils' Plotinus claims that matter is absolute evil, "a sort of ... nonexistence".84 For 
Plotinus the living being is a mixture of pure matter and the intellectual soul, which 
creates a body when it interacts with matter. The soul then must care for the body and 
risks being confronted with evils during its guardianship. However, Plotinus claims that 
evils are the means to a greater good, saying, "if [evils] did not exist the All would be 
imperfect. .. most of them, even all of them, contribute something useful to the Whole". 85 
By posing such a conception, "Plotinus gets away with a paradoxical combination of 
dualistic and monistic ideas". 86 Although absolute evil exists, it has very little power. It is 
not a second Principle which opposes the Good; in fact it is so weak so as to not even 
exist without the One. Evil cannot affect anything higher in the hierarchy of the cosmos 
than the soul, and even then it does not affect all of them, and the soul can escape. It is 
84 1.8[51]3 
85 11.3[52]18. The language of perfection is that of being •finished'. 
86 Opsomer 159 
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''the degree of least possible perfection" in the universe and its good contributions to the 
universe make it a derisory principle of absolute evil. 87 Thus, Plotinus is able to justify 
evil's existence, avoid dualism (which is also a Christian desire, for instance Augustine's 
objections to the Manicheans), and make sense of a creature's free will and capacity for 
doing evil without demeaning the power of the One (Plotinus' God). Moreover the 
mixture of the goodness bestowed upon the creature by the One and the evil bestowed 
upon it due to its composition explain its metaphysical capacity for sin, its original 
imperfection. 
However, original imperfection theories like Plotinus' and Leibniz's are prone to 
metaphysical objections. These objections are extremely difficult to answer. In Plotinus, 
queries about what matter is, whether the One generated it, and how the soul and matter 
create a body are unanswered (or unsatisfactorily answered). Likewise, for Leibniz we 
can ask questions such as, "Relative to what is a creature imperfect?" "What kind of 
vessel is a creature?" and "Why can we sin when, for instance, animals and angels 
cannot?" Moreover Leibniz has other metaphysical considerations, such as his theory of 
complete concepts, at work which further muddle the issue. 
It is debatable whether such objections are better than the other type of objections. I think 
that Leibniz would believe so, given that the other type of objections either deal with an 
unrealistic picture of God's nature or of concurrence. Moreover, he might think that both 
types are better than the Malebranchean answer that God could have created better 
worlds but is constrained by the simplicity of his laws to create this one. (Along with 
87 Opsomer 159 
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Malebranche's occasionalist views, this cripples divine power, concurrence, and 
Leibniz's belief that this world is the best). But before we conclude let me reintroduce the 
problem of Descartes. While Descartes doesn't exactly give a theodicy (rather, 
expounding an 'error theory'), his unique theory of evil is defmitely worth discussing. 
For Descartes, the will consists in a withholding of our assent. 88 But this leads to a puny 
conception of human will. 
Descartes believes that humans are "hybrid[ s] of being and nothingness". 89 This 
condition is "the precondition for moral and cognitive lapses"; so, our errors are our 
responsibility. He also embraces the greater good defense.90 However, whatever 
problems there are with Descartes' conception of the will (since he vacillates between the 
quasi-Augustinian conception that Leibniz ascribes to him and the quasi-Molinist 
conception that Leibniz also rejects), the greater problem lies in Descartes' conception of 
God. God is not answerable to logic or reason; sometimes we will just not understand his 
reasons, not because of our own limitations, but because they are not what we would 
understand as 'reasons' .91 Thus, Latzer concludes that "no possible theodicy will be 
effective"-Descartes, in not systematizing God's justifications, has cut himself off from 
the greater good defense and thus from a reasonable way of explaining evils.92 Descartes' 
God could have created a world without evils, unlike Leibniz's, Malebranche's, or even 
Plotinus' God, and thus is answerable to the question why he did not. 
88 CSM I 194 (AT SA; 6) 
89 Latzer 37 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 46 
92 Ibid. 47. Descartes could say that the evil is merely phenomenal and doesn't actually exist, but if the 
point is to avoid trouble from the Church, then that obviously cannot be his recourse. 
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For now, let us leave aside privation theory and examine some other parts ofLeibniz's 
development in the 1680s. 
1680s Writings on Evil 
In this section I attempt to provide an analysis of some ofLeibniz's writings on evil and 
free will that bridges the period between the Confessio and the Theodicy. Although the 
subject of this paper is Leibniz's Von der Allmacht, I think it is important not to neglect 
the 1680s period by clouding it with my own agenda. Sleigh approaches this period only 
to quote 'De libertate' and muster evidence for his conclusion about Leibniz and 
privation theory, despite the fact that he has translated some of the major fragments into 
English. Likewise, Rateau, whose book traces the evolution ofLeibniz's thought on evil 
and culminates in an analysis of the Theodicy, barely quotes any texts from this period 
despite spending an entire chapter on it. 
Having read the texts in question, I can definitely say that they are worth examining. 93 It 
is my hope that including a short analysis here will attract further attention. Many of the 
texts include notes about the nature of God; for instance, in 'De probanda divina 
existentia' Leibniz argues against the idea ''that Existence is in the concept of the most 
perfect Being".94 1n 'De libertate et necessitate', a text which is translated in the Ariew 
and Garber volume, Leibniz revisits his idea about what conception of the will is implied 
by believing that everything exists for a reason and that there is no such thing as perfect 
93 They will be presented in roughly chronological order (speculative, of course). 
94 A.VI.iv 1390 
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indifference. Then he endorses a conception of possible and necessary that should sound 
familiar: 
I hold a concept of possibility and necessity according to which there are some 
things that are possible, which, nevertheless, are not necessary, and which do not 
actually exist. From this it follows that a reason that brings it about that one thing 
exists rather than others, does not lead to necessity, and, accordingly, a reason that 
always brings it about that a free mind chooses one thing rather than another, 
whether it arises from the perfection of the thing, as it does in God's case, or from 
our imperfection, does not eliminate our freedom.95 
This text goes on to distinguish between absolute and hypothetical necessity, which picks 
up on a theme in the Confossio, but the strategy is exactly the same as the one I employed 
in my analysis of V dA-that is, of showing that the necessary and possible things don't 
overlap neatly. Likewise, a similar text, 'De libertate a necessitate in eligendo', tries to 
work out the objection that, because God foresaw the series of things which he would 
actualize, he willed that Adam would sin.96 'De libertate et gratia' talks about the 
different aspects of freedom-again objecting to perfect indifference and defending free 
will as the ability to choose A or B or to suspend judgment. 97 At the end of this piece 
Leibniz demonstrates that he is still firmly against the idea of separation theory. He 
claims that men willing to "consider that the idea or concept of a creature .. .is prior to the 
decree of the divine will" and furthermore, that the concept was "based on [the divine] 
intellect", "would see how it is that God produces all the reality in evil actions, and 
95 A.VI.iv 1444-1449 
96 Ibid. 1450-1455 
97 Ibid. 1455-1460 
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nevertheless" does not cause evil.98 This view is quite similar to that of the Theodicy, 
although Leibniz isn't explicit about how God's is responsible for evil actions but not for 
evil itself. Of course, this idea (separating the divine intellect from the divine will) is also 
present in the Confessio. 
In another work, 'De natura veritatis, contingentiae, et indifferentiae atque de libertate et 
praedeterminatione', Leibniz has an extremely interesting discussion of some of the 
major points of the Confessio, once again alluding to the idea of complete concepts. This 
work is definitely worth reading for its discussion on necessity, possibility and 
predetermination, although I cannot do more than highlight that here.99 In 'De libertate 
creaturae rationalis', Leibniz once again makes allusions to his rejection of separation 
theory and middle knowledge. He says, "It cannot be explained how God would not be 
the cause of sin, ifhe produced all the reality that is in the most sinful act", and 
furthermore that "when a man chooses to sin, he is not indifferent immediately before his 
choice, otherwise the transition to evil must be ascribed not to him, but to God". In this 
passage he further discusses the premise that indifference cannot directly precede free 
choice. 100 
The last text I will discuss is 'De libertate, fato, gratia dei' (De libertate). This is the text 
cited by Sleigh as evidence for Leibniz's acceptance of separation theory (an 
interpretation against which I have already argued). Unlike some of the other texts, this 
one has a definite introduction in the style of V dA and the Theodicy: 
98 Ibid. 
99 A.VI.iv 1514-1524 
100 Ibid. 1590-1594 
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Among all the questions discussed once providence has been finnly established, 
none is disseminated more widely among religions and nations, none is more 
important to human life, than that concerning freedom, fate, and the grace of God, 
and connected matters.101 
Leibniz believes that there are two possible approaches to the topic, one from "first 
principles" and the other from "religion and practical philosophy ... reconciled with the 
principles of speculative philosophy" .102 There is no clearer statement of Leibniz' s 
double-edged method when it comes to theological topics, something which should be 
remembered in the next section when I discuss the methodological similarities between 
VdA and the Theodicy. That is, he definitely employs both in those texts. In 'De libertate' 
Leibniz starts from theses that "pious and prudent men accept", laying out several truths 
about God and theodicy. Leibniz then proceeds to grapple with the problem of divine 
foreknowledge, alluding to the example ofKeilah (mistakenly called Ziklag in VdA, 
corrected in the Theodicy). There are also superficial similarities in tone and style, despite 
the fact that VdA is a German work, 'De libertate' is Latin, and the Theodicy is in French. 
Therefore, although the theodicean philosophy in 'De libertate' is similar to that of the 
Confessio, its method and style put it squarely in the same category as V dA and the 
Theodicy. If one reads all three and highlights these similarities, one can put together a 
package of topics that Leibniz tends to discuss when in the practical/speculative style: 
(1) The falsity of scholastic beliefs. 
101 Ibid. 1595-1612 
102 A.VI.iv 1595-1612 
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(2) Sustained beliefs in the nature of God. 
(3) Punishment and reward, including salvation. 
( 4) Biblical examples. 
(5) The lazy reason/the paradox of God's foreknowledge and divine necessity. 
Moreover, this is a Leibniz poised on making the breakthroughs that distinguish the 
Theodicy from the Confessio, who mentions possible worlds and imperfection theory in 
the same piece as the series of events and the permission of sin. Finally, the text ends 
with the story of Pyrrha and Deucalion, just as the Theodicy has the famous story of 
Sextus (a tradition that is decidedly Platonic). (Perhaps V dA was meant to end with a 
story?) 
This concludes our section on the 1680s. To summarize what I've done, I have discussed 
the major scholarly interpretations ofVdA and its relationship with the Confessio, 
established a distinction between separation theory and imperfection theory, and made 
some comparisons to works in the 1680s period. Now it is time to tackle Leibniz's major 
work, the Theodicy. 
The Theodicy 
In the introduction, I mentioned the thesis that there are several types of similarity 
between VdA and the Theodicy. To summarize, the Theodicy contains discussions of 
several topics that are at least touched upon in V dA, for instance those on middle 
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knowledge, privation theory, the Lazy Reason, and the evil will. It also employs a similar 
strategy. Many of these points come up in Book One of the Theodicy or even earlier. 
Thus I suggest that, as in V dA, Leibniz is exorcising old beliefs and clearing ground for 
his own ideas, which he gradually introduces. Because of the length and nature of the 
Theodicy, I intend to present these findings roughly in order of importance. 
Leibniz's main intent is to discuss reconciling the power of God with the freedom of 
man: 
I have taken up my pen more than once ... to give explanations on these important 
matters. But finally I have been compelled to gather up my thoughts on all these 
connected questions, and to impart them to the public. It is this that I have 
undertaken in the Essays which I offer here, on the Goodness of God, the 
Freedom of Man, and the Origin ofEvi1.103 
Thus, this is the same exact issue he takes up in V dA, with the added question of the 
(metaphysical) origin of evil. In fact, the above passage even indicates that he has 
perhaps looked through his previous writings on evil before writing the Theodicy. There 
are some indications he may have done so, mostly pertaining to the content of both 
works, but also with respect to the style. It should be apparent from the Confessio alone 
that Leibniz was no stranger to experimenting with different forms of presentation, but 
for some reason he wrote the Theodicy not in the careful and laconic style of the 
Monadology or in the engaging, if perplexing, format of a dialogue, but in a style which 
has one major predecessor: 'Von der Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes und der Freiheit 
103 Theodicy Preface 55 
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des Menschen'. Now, this claim is partially my own opinion-nowhere does Leibniz say 
that he was inspired "by a short piece I wrote many years ago in my unwieldy native 
tongue". However, for me these stylistic and contentful similarities, when taken together, 
form a plausible case for the influence ofVdA on the Theodicy. 
In the Preface and the other early parts of the Theodicy (say, through most of Book I), 
Leibniz adopts a similar language, tone and narrative structure as that ofVdA. First of all, 
the sentiments expressed can get a bit flowery (can you imagine the Monadology 
beginning with, "Of all the questions that bewilder the human race" or with "There are 
two famous labyrinths where our reason very often goes astray"?). But rather than mere 
poetic embellishment, this language is meant to grip you and immerse you in the problem 
at hand. Furthermore, Leibniz adopts the tone that he might in a letter or a public speech, 
using a lot of 'we' and 'you' and relating his plan for the work, as well as past 
achievements, as he might to a correspondent (more about this later). Of course, the 
Theodicy was originally published anonymously, but that is even more suitable: the work 
becomes that of an anonymous narrator speaking to his anonymous correspondents. Also, 
as we shall see when I discuss the content of the Theodicy, but which should be apparent 
to anyone who has read the book, Leibniz summons a host of historical scholars and 
ideas. Not only does this demonstrate his intelligence and erudition, but it serves to 
educate the reader (or, if you prefer, to inundate readers with more names and terms than 
a Tolstoy novel). Thus, although Leibniz remains focused on advancing his positive 
philosophy and defeating the ideas of his opponents, there is a 'wandering' feel to the 
work, as there was in V dA. Likewise, there is the language issue: at the end of the 
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Preface Leibniz apologizes for any mistakes in his French and takes full responsibility for 
them. This remark lends credence to Sleigh's idea that "perhaps some measure of 
Leibniz's usual precision is a byproduct of writing in languages foreign to him, i.e., Latin 
and French". 104 My suggestion is that it wasn't until late in his career that Leibniz felt 
comfortable writing in this style in French and Latin, and considering that he must have 
abandoned the idea advanced in V dA that German was a suitable language for 
philosophy (an idea supported by empirical evidence, or rather, by a paucity of works in 
that language), the reason that so few of his texts are written in this style does have to do 
with the language barrier. Although I do agree with Sleigh that this style makes the 
Theodicy very 'flowery' and 'bombastic' compared to his other works, I must point out 
here that Leibniz's contemporary audience had different sensibilities than we do. 
Whereas most of his works are shockingly modem, Leibniz wrote the Theodicy in a style 
that was pitched towards a general audience (not by way of Russell's public/private 
distinction, but in terms of what was most marketable and familiar). One needs but peruse 
the works of Swift, Defoe and Berkeley (who all published works in 1710) to feel the 
weight of the three hundred years that separate us from the Theodicy. Consider this 
sentence from the beginning of Berkeley's Principles: 
Prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts discover themselves to our 
view; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn 
into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and 
grow upon us as we advance in speculation, till at length, having wandered 
through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, or, which 
104 Introduction to the Yale Confessio volume, xxiv 
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is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism.105 
In terms of historical doctrines, Leibniz discusses the Lazy Reason twice in the Theodicy, 
both times invoking a familiar line of argument to defeat it. Immediately after he 
introduces and motivates the problem of evil, he says that "men have been perplexed by" 
the Lazy Reason for centuries and have taken it to imply that "that which must happen 
will happen, whatever I may do". 106 Leibniz again stresses the solution-that 
foreknowledge of an event must be separated from the causes of an event. He likens it to 
the Turkish chain of necessity and says that one must avoid reasoning in the Turkish 
fashion. Then, later on, in Book One, he brings it up again, using his theory of possible 
worlds to help him. God foresaw what would happen freely and chose the best possible 
world on the basis of the effects and causes within it. However, that does not mean that 
the effects come about without "proportionate causes". 107 Thus, although Leibniz's 
possible-worlds theory allows him to explicate the fallacy of the Lazy Reason, it is not 
required to do so; he defeats it in the Preface exactly as he did in V d.A, by showing that 
foreknowing the causes and effects is not the same as causing the effects. 
Also present in the Book One are a couple other ideas which should be familiar to us-
first is the idea of an evil will, which Leibniz said in V dA was wholly responsible for sin. 
Here he says: 
An evil will is in its department what the evil principle of the Manicheans would 
be in the universe; and reason, which is an image of the Divinity, provides for evil 
105 Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge, S 1 
106 Theodicy Preface 54-6. 
107 Theodicy 1.55 (156) 
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souls great means of causing much evil. One single Caligula, one Nero, has 
caused more evil than an earthquake.108 
This quote is quite puzzling given the rest ofLeibniz's moral psychology (it doesn't seem 
as though most rational people can knowingly do great harm, but 'evil souls' can cause 
much evil by use of reason?) but the core idea which is present both here and in V dA is 
that an evil will is the worst possible thing a human can have and makes that human 
being responsible for the sins it commits. The next familiar idea is entangled with the 
concept of God's prescience not being predestination-it is the idea of scientia media.109 
In my discussion ofVdA I associated this with Buridan's ass, which Leibniz does 
explicitly in Section 49. Leibniz still holds that middle knowledge is impossible because 
God simply would not foreknow what choice someone would make if there were not a 
sufficient reason to make that choice; thus he believes that a scenario of indifference (that 
is, where reason doesn't incline one way or the other) is impossible. It violates both the 
conception of God as omniscient and prescient, and Leibniz's PSR. To enumerate the 
problem, Leibniz once again takes us to Ziklag (now correctly named Keilah) and 
launches yet another argument which should be familiar to readers of V dA. Leibniz does 
use possible worlds in his discussion, but again they play only an illustrative role. 
I believe that the historical theories and fallacies discussed in both works play the same 
role: they help men confront the reality of evil by facing it with faith that is reinforced by 
reason. This dictates their attitude towards evil and their responsibility toward sin; that is, 
108 Theodicy 1.26 (141-2) 
109 Leibniz also takes this up in Book Three, Sections 303-306. 
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men understand the origin of sin and can take solace in the fact that this is the best 
possible world when sin befalls them while still shouldering responsibility for the sins 
that they commit (and understanding the origin of such sins might help men sin less). As 
Leibniz points out in VdA, anger towards God at sin's existence is unproductive; even if 
a person has no understanding of why God didn't make men or the world free of sin, "it 
is enough that [they] did not want to give up ... sinning and take responsibility". 110 Leibniz 
believes that much of the work towards being saved lies in one's attitude; hence why 
there is nothing worse than an evil will, and why understanding who is to blame is so 
important. Though Voltaire blasted Leibniz on the very point that it is not much 
consolation in the face of suffering to tell oneself that this is the best possible world, this 
oversimplifies Leibniz's theory. Written in a time of personal tragedy for Leibniz, the 
Theodicy is the work of someone who understands how shallow such a belief can seem. 
But the point for any Christian is not to lose sight of the end goal of salvation. Although 
things may seem unjust in this world, not only is it but a shadow compared to the next, 
but it is the world in which punishment and reward are given out accordingly. Thus I 
don't think it is silly at all to desperately cling to Leibnizian optimism and to use nothing 
but rational faith as a panacea for dealing with evil. For a rational theologian like Leibniz, 
it is the only thing that makes sense, and it is why he finds Bayle's supremacy of faith 
over reason both disturbing in itself and in what kind of world would exist if it were true. 
Thus Leibniz must provide a rationally plausible picture of evil's existence. 
110 A.VI.i 542 
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This brings us to privation theory. This is a section of the Theodicy in which Leibniz 
begins to bring in his positive views in a more substantial way than before. He introduces 
the famous boat analogy to explain imperfection theory: 
Let us suppose that the current of one and the same river carried along with it 
various boats, which differ among themselves only in the cargo, some being laden 
with wood, others with stone, and some more, the others less. That being so, it 
will come about that the boats most heavily laden will go more slowly than the 
others ... it is not, properly speaking, weight which is the cause of this 
retardation ... [it is] matter itself which originally is inclined to slowness or 
privation of speed ... to moderate by its receptivity the effect of the impression.111 
In the historical picture, God would control the boats, the current and the speed in such a 
way that the creature would contribute exactly nothing. But by introducing the concept of 
inertia, which is taken from the physical idea endorsed by Kepler and Descartes (among 
others), Leibniz has provided an intelligible way for the creature to resist goodness and to 
be responsible for its resistance. Whereas before reality was divided into 'positive' and 
'negative' and the concept of privation led directly to sin, however unclearly, now the 
privation is internal to the creature as an 'original imperfection' that limits the amount of 
goodness it can receive. This imperfection, in tum, leads to particular instances of sin (the 
way that chronic joint pain can suddenly 'flare up'). To bring the idea back to the boat 
analogy, the burden of this inertia determines the speed of the boat and how fast it goes 
with the current. In the analogy, the natural inclination is towards goodness, so when man 
tends towards it, he acts in accordance with God, and when he goes against it, he is still 
111 Theodicy 1.30 (143-4) 
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acting concurrently with God, but because he is pulling in a different direction, God is 
free of all blame. While it is true that God still takes part in sinful actions, to say that he 
does not would, as Leibniz puts it on multiple occasions, destroy the chain of causes that 
ultimately extends back to God. 
The question is where the concurrence comes from under 'original imperfection' theory. 
The short answer is this: God desires to create a perfect musician, but the musician only 
receives part of the total goodness given to him by God. Then, God creates the 
circumstances of giving a concert on December 4 at 8:00. The musician's failure to 
receive all of God's goodness, due to his own nature, will result in his flubbing a couple 
of measures in a difficult passage. But the responsibility isn't God's; it's the musicians. 
(Perhaps he should have practiced more). In Leibniz the connection between the original 
imperfection and each instance of sin isn't well-explicated, nor is the idea of degrees of 
receptivity to goodness and what exactly is blocking the full allowance of goodness from 
being imparted to each creature. 
However, problems such as the above pale in comparison to the necessitarian worry 
about the Theodicy: 
64 
(1) The best possible world is necessarily enacted. (God can (debatably) choose to 
create W or not to create W, but he is bound, if he creates, to create W). 
(2) Evils exist only as a means to obtain W. 
(3) Evils exist in W. 
(4) W is the best possible world. Therefore its constituents are pre-determined. As 
such, God knows all the details of the occurrence of every single evil. 
(5) God exists. 
(C) Each particular evil in W is willed by God. (is necessary). 
Adding in Leibniz's idea of the complete concept of a person-that somehow, all the of 
details and particulars of a person are contained in the concept of that person in God's 
mind-the idea that, for instance, the contents of God's mind and the facts that his 
foreknowledge tells him can be separated from his actions in a meaningful manner is a bit 
silly. Nevertheless, that is what Leibniz wants. Whether that is acceptable to his readers is 
another question. 
A Posteriori Reasoning 
Before going on, I intend to discuss the concept of a posteriori reasoning. This is a topic 
that came up both in my discussion ofVdA and of the Theodicy, and there are more 
conclusions to be drawn. In V dA I introduced the idea of a posteriori validity, the idea 
that one can reason backward in order to explicate causes. The notion itself is nothing 
new, having a rich history stretching back to the time of Aristotle, who first developed 
what we might think of as science to explain the world rather than metaphysics (which 
works the opposite way). 
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However, the issue of whether this idea applies to Leibniz 's science is one that I want to 
avoid for the most part. It has been written on at length, by Kulstad and Garber among 
others, and has attracted a lot of attention recently. Although I do agree that Leibniz's 
thought here is relevant, the question is really how. Garber believes that Leibniz's stance 
on the laws of nature changed in two ways during his life-although Leibniz always held 
that the laws of nature could be derived a priori, he changed his mind on two related 
issues and, at the time of the Theodicy, believed that the derivation of such laws 
depended on divine wisdom and that the laws of nature were thus contingent. Part of 
Leibniz's motivation could easily have come from a theologically-charged issue such as 
that of miracles, which Leibniz believes cannot violate logical necessity, but can violate 
physical necessity. 112 If the laws of nature were strictly derivable a priori, without 
depending on God (a view which the young Leibniz supported), then there is no way to 
explain how they can be altered. 
However, I want to move away from a strict identification of the two issues (a priori and 
a posteriori method applicability to matters of faith versus matters of science) for several 
reasons. Though I think that ultimately someone must really make sense of the issue 
catholically, either positing a real separation between the two areas ofLeibniz's thought 
(and justifying it plausibly) or formulating an all-encompassing system consistent with 
itself and with the late Leibniz' s thought, I am not equipped to handle the job, especially 
not within the scope of this project. It is my wish to demonstrate the case for the 
theological side; someone else can connect this labyrinth with the other. 113 The thesis that 
112 'lheodicy Dissertation 21 (89) 
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such a connection can be made is itself controversial; in a recent paper Garber argued that 
Leibniz was not a great systematizer, despite his reputation among the metaphysics-
hating analytic philosophers like Carnap, and that we should view his ideas as "loosely 
connected stars in the constellations of his thought.114 Whether that interpretation is 
agreeable (and to many it was not; Garber himself has moderated his stance on the 
subject115), the Theodicy 's connection to Leibniz's other works has been especially 
poorly understood. Although many of the remarks that Garber and Kulstad utilize are 
from the New Essays, a work from the same period as the Theodicy, the New Essays are 
themselves a response to John Locke, we're not sure how strongly Leibniz's theology is 
connected to his science, and it is enough for me merely to connect Leibniz's early and 
middle thought on evil with his later thought. 
While we're discussing these sorts of issues, my labels of 'early', 'middle' and 'late' are 
supposed to be neutral markers rather than set time periods to which I'm strongly 
committed. We can all agree that Leibniz started writing about evil and related problems 
early in his career, continued writing about them throughout, and then wrote a book on 
the subject. Part of my project has been to mark out when changes occurred and why, 
tracing out a line of understandable evolution in his thought. Although we don't have the 
important text from his juvenile period which would at least allow us to place V dA closer 
to that work or to the Confessio, there may be at minimum three periods of development 
that all culminate in a significant work, or, given other developments in his career that 
114 Daniel Garber, paper presented at the Notre Dame Conference "Leibniz's Theodicy: Context and 
Content", South Bend, IN, September 17th, 2010 
115 Daniel Garber, interview held during the Eastern Division APA, Boston, MA, December 28th, 2010 
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may have impacted his thought on evil, as many as five. Likewise, had Leibniz not died 
in 1716, he may have gone on to develop a theodicy that sought to remedy the Theodicy 's 
problems, just as he did in every preceding period when he realized that his solution 
wasn't good enough (Dan Garber at least believes that Leibniz's thought would have 
evolved ifhe had not been interrupted by his death). 116 
There are some philosophical problems with the issue of reconciling science and faith in 
Leibniz's thought as well. There is a difference between the ideal derivation of the laws 
of nature and the ways in which human beings process the world around them in order to 
gain knowledge. Furthermore, knowledge might be different than 'laws of nature', which 
have traditionally had a special status even if both are understood propositionally 
(countless problems in philosophy of science have arisen trying to figure out what exactly 
that special status is). Therefore, although ultimately for Leibniz all the laws and states of 
affairs depend on God, I feel secure in bracketing off the laws of nature. 
In order to continue making my case for similarities between V dA and the Theodicy, I am 
going to summarize (extremely briefly) the case for a posteriori reasoning in matters of 
faith from VdA. This is in line with Leibniz's conclusions about matters of theology. In 
the Theodicy, Leibniz starts by examining the relationship of faith and reason and then 
turning to metaphysical truths. Although he doesn't believe that faith and reason are 
incompatible, he definitely is working from the approach enumerated in 'De libertate', 
which is not from first principles but from "religion and practical philosophy ... reconciled 
116 In my first Leibniz seminar, Garber essentially concluded the story of Leibniz the philosopher with 
"And then he died." But there is something admirable about the fact that Leibniz never stopped in that 
regard, that he was always trying to improve on what he had. 
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with the principles of speculative philosophy". 117 In V d.A, Leibniz not only connected 
imagination and conceivability with possibility, but he considered the fact that sins exist 
in the world to be a fact which we can know a posteriori. 
Leibniz is clearer about these things in the Preliminary Dissertation. Saying that "reason, 
since it consists in the linking together of truths, is entitled to connect also those 
therewith experience has furnished it".ll8 However, he insists that pure reason deals only 
with a priori truths, whereas faith may be compared with experience, because faith 
depends on the account of those who have seen miracles and the inherited tradition of 
religion. 119 Next, he distinguishes between logical and positive truths. Logical truths are 
necessary truths, whereas positive truths "are the laws which it has pleased God to give 
Nature, or because they depend on those".120 Then Leibniz expounds the different types 
of positive truths: 
We learn them either by experience, that is, a posteriori, or by reason and a 
priori, that is, by the considerations of the fitness of things which have caused 
their choice. 121 
Leibniz claims that the Mysteries can only be known a posteriori because although they 
can be explained satisfactorily, we cannot comprehend them. 122 Thus, they can be moral 
certainties, but not absolute ones. (In case of a conflict between the two, absolute 
certainties have priority). According to this recasting of matters of faith and matters of 
117 A.VI.iv 1595-1612 
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reason, both faith and reason offer avenues to understanding-faith's, though it can 
explain greater affairs than human reason can, conveys less certainty due to its loftier 
subject matter. 
After a long aside about the historical relationship of faith and reason, including his 
famous distinction between above and against reason, Leibniz returns to discussing 
another problem which is in the domain of faith rather than reason-the existence of 
evil.123 Part of his objective is to rationally defend theology in a curious manner-rather 
than arguing against the philosophies of his opponents (though he makes it clear who 
they are and what they believe), Leibniz seeks to provide an alternative theory that is 
better than theirs. The audience can judge whose theory is the most successful. This, 
according to Leibniz, is a 'demonstration', and I believe that he makes use of this method 
at least three times in his career (although in every case, he skews the distinction 
somewhat by addressing the beliefs of his opponents and pointing out their flaws). The 
Confessio may also be seen as a type of demonstration, but because it is a dialogue in 
which a philosopher is convincing a theologian of his arguments, it is less clear that that 
is what Leibniz intended (as any good Platonist scholar knows, the philosophical 
dialogue form has the great advantage and/or weakness of placing the author at a remove 
from its content). 
So Leibniz begins with a familiar line of argument: 
It should even be concluded that there must have been great or rather invincible 
reasons which prompted the divine Wisdom to the permission of evil that 
123 Ibid. 23 (90) 
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surprises us, from the mere fact that this permission has occurred: for nothing can 
come from God that is altogether inconsistent with goodness, justice and holiness. 
Thus we can judge by the event (or a posteriori) that the permission was 
indispensible, although it be not possible for us to show this (a priori) by the 
detailed reasons that God can have had therefor.124 
Thus sins exist and God allowed them to exist; therefore, we must construct a plausible 
explanation for it a posteriori, while accepting that we will never understand it according 
to the chain of causes that actually motivated God. 
Compare this passage from V dA: 
Who could ever have denied that it stood within God's power to banish all sins 
from the world, and that he did not do this, ergo, he wants the sins to remain? 
Yes, he wants the sins to remain. For he holds it to be better that either they 
remain or they cease to exist. . .ifhe holds it to be better that they cease to exist, 
then they must cease to exist. .. because they have now remained in the world, this 
is a sign that God holds this to be best, and therefore wants to have them remain, 
and therefore wants to have sins in the world. Indeed, what is more, because God 
is the ultimate origin of all things and the reason why they exist and why they are 
so and not otherwise, it follows apparently that God creates and makes the sins of 
the world. Why do I now sin and commit murder? Because I will to do so and can 
do so. God gives me the ability to do so; the circumstances give me the will to do 
124 Theodicy Dissertation 35 (96) 
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so, but in fact God created the circumstances too, along with the whole chain of 
causes back to the beginning of the world. 125 
Only God has a grasp on the chain of causes; therefore, he must have had a good reason 
not only to permit sin to exist, but to allow each particular sin which he foresaw. But 
again, we can only provide a plausible explanation for this (Leibniz's plausible 
explanation is presented in Book One, as I have been discussing). 
However, Leibniz does worry about the idea that appearances can be deceiving-that is, 
that experience can lead us to judge incorrectly about the truth. In another passage he 
addresses this concern: 
For if we were capable of understanding the universal harmony, we should see 
that what we are tempted to find fault with is connected with the plan most 
worthy of being chosen; in a word, we should see, and should not believe only, 
that what God has done is the best. I call 'seeing' here what one knows a priori by 
the causes, and 'believing' what one only knows by the effects, even though the 
one be as certainly known as the other. 126 
This fits into Leibniz' s argument that both types of arriving at positive truths are just as 
good, even if one is not comprehended by us (what 'comprehended' here means is 
something close to the Scholastic technical term of fully being able to explicate from first 
principles). But the contrast between seeing and believing takes us right back to VdA's 
125 A.VI.i 543-544 
126 Theodicy Dissertation 44 (I 0 I) 
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definitions of conceivability. The original French text reads 'imaginer', which is 
connected with the term 'einbilden' that I discussed in VdA. Here 'imagine' is obviously 
a technical term and is connected with the a priori reasoning of the ideal reasoner-in 
this case, God. 
Leibniz and the Contemporary Debate 
In the last section I would like to analyze Leibniz's connection of conceivability with 
possibility from a different angle. 127 In recent years the idea has been taken up in 
contemporary analytic philosophy that it is worthwhile to capture the connection between 
the two, and I believe that opening a dialogue with an important historical source can not 
only be of interest to contemporary philosophers, but will also be fruitful for Leibniz 
scholars as well. It is clear that the connection is not recognized in the inaugural work on 
the subject, Stephen Yablo's 1993 'Is Conceivability A Guide to Possibility?' (ed. 2004). 
Yablo introduces the problem by quoting Hume. The Hume quote is Hume's answer to 
the challenge of needing to distinguish between propositions which are possible and 
those which aren't. Hume states that "whatever the mind clearly conceives, includes the 
idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely 
impossible" .128 However, just as this idea has a historical background, so do doubts about 
its validity and applicability. Yablo cites Mill as summarizing the objection: 
127 Although I will only be explicitly addressing V d.A, the last section should have made clear that, due to 
the strong connections between Vd.A and the Theodicy on this issue, Leibniz's work in the Theodicy 
should also be relevant. 
128 Hume's Treatise on Human Nature, cited in Yablo. 
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Our capacity or incapacity of conceiving a thing has very little to do with the 
possibility of the thing in itself; but is in truth very much an affair of accident, and 
depends on the past history and habits of our own minds. 129 
Y ablo' s paper addresses those who assume that p is possible if it can be conceived 
(which he claims is "most of us, most of the time"). 130 Thus, his mission is to legitimize 
or codify conceivability: recognizing that the connection between conceivability and 
possibility is already in common use, he wants to establish some ground rules for when it 
can be used--or, if it is not a legitimate connection, to prove that it is not. Y ablo claims 
straightaway that counterattacks such as "no independent evidence exists that 
conceivability is a guide to possibility" and that naturalism doesn't allow for "a bodily 
mechanism attuned to reality's modal aspects" are too broad; if accepted such arguments 
would work against faculties such as intuition as well (presumably a hardcore naturalist 
could bite the bullet and say that no such faculties exist, but Yablo's paper is aimed at a 
sympathetic audience). 131 
However, Yablo, like Leibniz before him, recognizes the gap between possibility and the 
appearance of possibility, an appearance which can be both representative (p 
phenomenally appearing possible) and epistemic (involving the belief that p is 
possible).132 In Leibniz's Von der Allmachtthese conditions are implicit in Pl and P2, 
and the actual condition, that p really be possible, is captured in P3. Pl states that ifx is 
129 Mill, Book II Chapter V Section 6 
130 Yablo 2; pagination is from the 2004 version available on his website. 
131 Ibid. 3 
132 Yablo 6 
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possible, x can be clearly explained without confusion and without contradiction. This 
corresponds to the epistemic appearance of possibility, because a belief must be formed 
that p is possible in order for the possibility/conceivability connection to be fully 
satisfied. Likewise, P2 deals with the representative component: p must appear possible 
(otherwise there would be no reason to form that belief).133 However, Pl and P2 are 
meaningless without P3 which, despite its focus on action in Leibniz can be understood 
as an existence condition. In order to explicate this I will unpack some examples. 
Let's examine the case of my becoming the President of the United States. This is 
something which phenomenally appears possible, though it may be about as plausible as, 
say, Sarah Palin becoming the President. Moreover, one can enumerate an entire chain of 
reasoning that moves one to believe in p, namely that I become President. (The belief 
doesn't have to be strong, since we are talking about bare possibility here, not plausibility 
or likelihood). However, in this case p is actually not possible because I was born outside 
of the United States (the so-called Alexander Hamilton clause). In this case, one has 
considered a possibility and made an error in judging it, thus forming a false belief. 
(Furthermore, in a case where p doesn't appear phenomenally possible, but actually is, 
one has not only cognitively erred, but one has also not fairly considered the possibility at 
all). 
On the other hand, there are cases where something can be imagined but not believed. 
What if wizards, a la Harry Potter, actually existed? One can imagine a world in which 
that was the case (J.K. Rowling most fruitfully, of course, but anyone who has been 
133 'Appearing possible' here implies that p can be imagined. 
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captivated by the books and movies as well); however, given what we know about the 
world, it would be hard even for a fanatic to form the belief that it was possible. Finally, 
there are also cases where one neither imagines nor believes but p is possible-these are 
cases of pure ignorance. In these examples there is no difference between p being an 
action (say, the possibility of hitting a home run in Fenway Park) and p being a property 
or existing thing (the possibility of being a natural blonde, the possibility of the United 
States). But in every case, all three requirements together are necessary to link 
conceivability with possibility. Without imagination one has not recognized the 
possibility correctly; without belief one has not cognitively endorsed it. Although some 
people (as Leibniz points out) equate imagination with conception, the resultant 
definition of possibility is too weak and admits things such as unicorns, married 
bachelors, and Hitler winning the Nobel Peace Prize. I have witnessed many arguments 
in philosophy which are simply quibbles about what definition of possibility is valid-
some adamant person will always insist that 'possibility' does apply to those sorts of 
propositions, and others will be quite unable to explain why that's not correct. While in 
common parlance 'possibility' can be thought of in this weak way, philosophical 
possibility needs to be more rigorous in order to do any work as a valuable definition. 
Yablo's paper essentially argues for this conclusion and goes on to draw ramifications 
about types of modal error and how we should understood modal disagreements. It shares 
many ideas with Leibniz's definitions and his argument against fatalism in VdA, 
although Leibniz is only really responding to a specific modal error that is being made, 
not a class of modal errors. However, despite the conditions in which Leibniz's 
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definitions first arose, I do believe that they had a larger impact on the development of 
Leibniz's modality. David Chalmers, building on Yablo's work, makes a number of 
important points about the link between conceivability and possibility, points which can 
be applied to Leibniz's work in the area. Although Chalmers has made use of the notion 
of conceivability before, most famously in The Conscious Mind, there is a 2003 paper in 
a Blackwell anthology that strictly addresses the issue.134 
Chalmers motivates the problem by discussing what sort of possibility we can reasonably 
expect from conceivability; in his eyes, it is metaphysical possibility that is up for grabs. 
The first thing that he recognizes is that one cannot quibble with the power and capability 
of reasoning if one is to get anything from a theory of conceivability. Thus he must "take 
certain rational notions as primitive"-nothing more arcane than our standard 
assumptions about reasoning and how we evaluate conflicting ideas. 135 Leibniz must do 
this as well, since at the time of writing V dA it was unclear that he had developed many 
ideas about rationality, although there are visible notions present. Therefore, although in 
both philosophers it's unclear how much practical application will match the ideal 
process, this is not an objection to the theory itself. 
134 The Conscious Mind reference is Chalmers' argument against materialism. In an expanded paper on his 
website, Chalmers summarizes the argument as follows: (1) P&-Q is conceivable; (2) IfP&-Q is 
conceivable, P&-Q is metaphysically possible; (3) IfP&-Q is metaphysically possible, materialism is 
false; (4) Materialism is false. Chalmers runs the argument such that P "is the conjunction of all 
microphysical truths about the universe" and Q is "an arbitrary phenomenal truth", such as that one has 
a zombie double or that the world is a zombie world. Chalmers goes on to discuss types conceivability 
in order to legitimize his argument and save it from objections; the 2003 paper can be seen as a 
continuation of that justification or as a somewhat separate metaphilosophical work about the 
connection between epistemology, metaphysics and modality. I think it is accurate to call it both. 
135 Chalmers 148 
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There are several conceivability distinctions in Chalmers. First, he differentiates between 
ideal and prima facie conceivability. These two ideas of conceivability are exactly what 
one would think they are: ideal being what is conceivable based on ideal rational 
reflection, and prima facie being the first impression of conceivability. Of course, the 
latter isn't based on a mere snap judgment but on a subject's process of reflection-
however, prima facie conceivability is still prone to error, whereas ideal conceivability is 
not. The second distinction is between positive and negative conceivability. These are 
also fairly intuitive--S is negatively conceivable when S is not ruled out. Types of ruling 
out include a priori, "when there is no (apparent) contradiction in S" .136 S might also be 
indeterminate, although Chalmers argues against that type of ruling out due to the fact 
that if S is indeterminate, it is a priori indeterminate rather than a priori neutral-that is, 
S could be determinate or indeterminate but one must withhold judgment. To put it 
formally (to try to avoid confusion): 
S is negatively conceivable when det(S) cannot be ruled out; 
S is ideally negatively conceivable when it is not a priori that "'<iet(S); 
S is ideally indeterminate when it is a priori that --det(S). 137 
This is an important distinction, because one might be tempted to conflate ideal negative 
conceivability with ideal indeterminacy. The easiest way to characterize the difference is 
this: S cannot be ruled out except in cases where there are strong motivations to do so, 
such as in the case ofthe proposition "Round squares exist", which goes against physical 
possibility, or in cases of logical contradiction, or in cases of privileged information (if 
136 Chalmers 149 
137 Ibid. 149-150 
78 
you know Josh is an arachnophobe, then you can rule out the possibility that he has 
adopted a tarantula with strong certainty). More information is necessary to process cases 
where S cannot be ruled out. By contrast, indeterminate cases are those where either 
possibility could be true, and more information is still necessary, but the outcome could 
be that of a positive conception (affirming S's possibility) or a negative one (denying it). 
Because the 'ideal' label marks a reasoner who is always accurate, there is less overlap 
between the two categories than there would otherwise be. 
But the more important notion is positive conceivability, because unlike negative 
conceivability, positive conceptions require a "positive conception of a situation in which 
S is the case". 138 This notion strongly connects to the issues discussed in Leibniz due to 
the use of the imagination. Though 'imagination' still has non-rigorous connotations, the 
contemporary analytic discussion has shifted towards "placing the varieties of positive 
conceivability under the broad rubric of imagination". 139 There are a couple of ways that 
this might be legitimized--Chalmers suggests something akin to a thought-experiment, 
whereas Amy Kind, another philosopher who has worked on the imagination in 
particular, suggests something akin to a computer simulation.140 Positive conception, in 
its most rudimentary form, must involve some imagination purely because one must 
present a positive conception of a situation. Whether this is the rich mental landscape of 
the creative artist dreaming up a work or the utilitarian tools of the mathematician 
employing spatial reasoning is open to question. 
138 Chalmers 150 
139 Ibid. 
140 Presented in Kind. Section II. 
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Chalmers attempts to refine the definition of imagination by claiming that "when one 
imagines a situation and reasons about it, the object of one's imagination is often 
revealed as a situation in which S is this case, for some 8". 141 If so, the situation verifies 
S; one has imagined that S. However, the issue is very complex because "different 
notions of conceivability correspond to different notions of imagination". 142 Perceptual 
imagination involves a mental image that S, whereas modal imagination gives us an 
intuition that a world exists in which S. In both cases the act of imagining S must verify 
S. However, Chalmers is quick to point out that both types of imagining to do involve 
any ontological commitments. It's quite easy to imagine a world with actual Pegasi. Thus 
what we imagine are (in every case) apparent worlds or situations. Moreover, these 
worlds and situations far outstrip the limits of possibility. 
In order to eliminate being able to, for instance, modally imagine a world in which round 
squares exist, Chalmers introduces a coherency constraint: details can be filled it, and no 
contradiction arises. Thus, he formulates a new definition of positive conceivability: 
S is positively conceivable when S is coherently modally imaginable.143 
Ideal and prima facie versions of ideal modal conceivability can then be introduced. Our 
final result is that possibility in every case of S involves a modal appearance of S; 
however, as Chalmers says, "I think it best not to import the notion of possibility so 
directly into a definition of conceivability, to avoid the threat of trivializing the link with 
141 Chalmers 150 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. 151 
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possibility". 144 This is akin to both Yablo's and Leibniz's recognition that a strong 
identification between the two concepts is not possible; rather, an intermediate 
relationship must be posed. 
In many ways, what Chalmers is doing is systematizing or defining the ideas picked out 
by Y ablo and, before him, Leibniz. But there are a couple of important points that 
Leibniz scholars should take note of-first of all, there are two types of imagination in 
Chalmers, perceptual and modal. An interesting question is whether Leibniz would 
acknowledge both of these or if he was only talking about perceptual imagination? 
Despite the fact that he did not distinguish between the two in his text, I find it hard to 
believe that he couldn't have thought of some examples where imagining a strong visual 
case was difficult, especially in the theological domain. Likewise, if there is a strand of 
modal imagination in Leibniz, then such a thought could play an important role in 
understanding his idea of possible worlds. Although Leibniz didn't have a Kripkean idea 
of possible worlds, I find it plausible that he would consider different sets of 
circumstances to comprise sets of possible worlds, a belief which is only bolstered by his 
ideas of complete concepts and even the different 'series of affairs' from the Confessio 
period. Of course, Leibniz has an advantage over modem proponents of possible worlds 
in that he can define them, simply, as worlds which God could have actualized. This 
thesis gives him a basis for justifying his conception of possible worlds unavailable to 
contemporary philosophers. 
144 Ibid. 156 
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Making sense of Leibniz's modality cannot occur solely as a logical discussion-that is, it 
must take into account his metaphysics as well. And nowhere is there a richer 
metaphysics in Leibniz than that which he deploys in order to solve the problem of evil, 
one of the two great labyrinths in which, he thought, human minds can so easily wander 
astray.I45 
145 Theodicy Preface 55 
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